finding that where a necessary element to convict is supplied only by the tainted evidence, the error is not harmless
How later courts described this case
- finding that where a necessary element to convict is supplied only by the tainted evidence, the error is not harmless
- acknowledging that “it is conceivable that an individual might say the word ‘no’ with a look or a tone of voice communicating some ambiguity or confusion”
- police officers “surprised” when suspect .answered “no” to the fourth question although he had previously seemed eager to speak and had checked “yes” in response to. the third question
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*319 TERRY, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join in the opinion and judgment of the court. I add these few words to emphasize that our reversal of appellant’s conviction is not based on any finding of trickery or deviousness on the part of Detective Cor-boy. Appellant suggests that Corboy may have acted improperly by instructing the transporting officers not to talk to appellant, or that the manner in which he dealt with appellant may have been slyly designed to elicit a confession that would appear to have been volunteered, and therefore beyond the reach of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The record simply does not support such an argument; on the contrary, it makes plain — at least to me— that everything Corboy did was done entirely in good faith. We are reversing appellant’s conviction solely because Detective Corboy asked one question too many. Once appellant answered “no” to the fourth question on the PD-47, Corboy should have said nothing more. The confession that resulted from the ensuing conversation must be suppressed under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 , 105 S.Ct. 490 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984).