stating that destruction of evidence does not violate a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial unless (1) the evidence had exculpatory value that was apparent before its destruction, (2) the defendant is unable to obtain evidence of comparable value, and (3) the State acted in bad faith
How later courts described this case
- stating that destruction of evidence does not violate a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial unless (1) the evidence had exculpatory value that was apparent before its destruction, (2) the defendant is unable to obtain evidence of comparable value, and (3) the State acted in bad faith
- stating that even when the lost evidence is apparently exculpatory, bad faith “must be present”
- "A search conducted incident to a lawful arrest is a recognized exception to the general rule that a warrant be obtained in order to conduct a search."
- reasonable suspicion was not required to justify questioning and request to search vehicle during lawful traffic stop
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CALKINS, J.,
with whom SAUFLEY, J., joins, concurring.
[¶ 17] I write separately to indicate that I concur in the portion of the decision concerning the consent to search because our prior decisions hold that we assume that the suppression judge found all facts necessary to the grant or denial of a suppression motion in the absence of a request for findings. See State v. Izzo, 623 A.2d 1277, 1280-81 (Me.1993) (upholding denial of suppression motion and stating that appellant- has the burden to request that court expand on findings; in the absence of such a request, we assume the suppression court found all facts necessary to support its ruling); State v. Powell, 591 A.2d 1306 , 1308 n. 4 (Me.1991) (upholding suppression order and noting that because State failed to request findings, we assume that suppression court found all necessary facts to support grant of motion). Given that Kremen did not request additional findings, pursuant to M.R.Crim. P. 41A(d), we assume that the court found the historical facts necessary for its denial of the motion.
[¶ 18] I agree with the dissent that if Kremen was unlawfully detained at the time she was asked for permission to search, her consent would be invalid. I cannot conclude from the facts contained in the court’s written findings that Kre-men’s. detention at that time was illegal as a matter of law. 6 See State v. Rizzo, 1997 ME 215, ¶ 11 , 704 A.2d 339, 342-43 (stating that we review independently legal conclusions based on the historical facts found by the trial court). Likewise, if the court had found facts indicating that Kre-men was in custody to a degree associated with arrest, her consent would be invalid if she had not been given Miranda warnings and waived the Miranda rights, and if the court had found her consent was not voluntarily given, the search results would have to be suppressed.
[¶ 19] The suppression court did not explicitly make findings, concerning the legality of the detention once the speeding tiek- *970 et was given; it did not make findings concerning custody; nor did it find that Kremen’s consent • was voluntary. 7 Because no further findings were requested by Kremen, and because we have repeatedly held that we assume that the court found all facts necessary to its decision when there is no request for findings, I concur that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
. The court’s only findings regarding the detention are as follows:
After some initial conversation between [the officer] and the Defendant, the officer asked her to accompany him to the police cruiser, and she did so. During the ensuing conversation, the Defendant advised [the officer] that she was driving to a rock concert in Aroostook County. While they were in the cruiser, [the officer] asked her if there was “anything illegál” in the vehicle. The Defendant responded in the negative. [The officer] then asked the Defendant if he could search the "front compartment area” of the vehicle. The Defendant consented to this.
. Although the suppression court did not find voluntariness explicitly, it discussed the vol-untariness issue in a footnote in its written decision. Thus, it would be difficult to conclude that the court did not implicitly find voluntariness.