The opinion
MACK, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I do not see the logic of remanding for a finding as to the alternative of a two-part disjunctive proviso where a finding has been previously made as to the other alternative. I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In my opinion, the circuit court’s decision in Consolidated Title Corporation v. District of Columbia, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 221 , 275 F.2d 885 , cert. denied, 364 U.S. 817 , 81 S.Ct. 48 , 5 L.Ed.2d 48 (1960), is controlling here, and unless and until this court reconsiders the issue en bane, 1 we are bound by its interpretation of “sources” in D.C.Code 1973, § 47-1571a. Under this view it is “immaterial that some of their [Peoples’] business was done elsewhere. We are not concerned with the sources of their income, but only with the sources of [Capital Holding’s] income.” 107 U.S.App.D.C. at 222, 275 F.2d at 886 .
Nor do I think that this tax was unconstitutional.
The test is whether property was taken without due process of law, or . whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return. [Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 , 61 S.Ct. 246, 250 , 85 L.Ed. 267 (1940).] See also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, - U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 1076 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977).
The tax may well have been burdensome while it existed, but that is not the issue. This franchise tax — for the privilege of receiving dividends paid by a District of Columbia corporation — was not, in my view, so unrelated to the District as to be constitutionally deficient.
I respectfully dissent.
. M. A. P. v. Ryan, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 310, 312 (1971).