explaining that equal protection does not preclude differential treatment of persons having different needs; the Legislature retains the power to classify, which flows from its general power to enact regulations for the health, safety, and welfare of the community
How later courts described this case
- explaining that equal protection does not preclude differential treatment of persons having different needs; the Legislature retains the power to classify, which flows from its general power to enact regulations for the health, safety, and welfare of the community
- noting that “the meaning and purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution ... and [Pennsylvania’s] Constitution’s prohibition against special laws ... are sufficiently similar to warrant like treatment, and that contentions concerning the two provisions may be reviewed simultaneously”
- finding that the classification at issue was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose and did not create a closed class of one member
- affirming that equal protection precepts "do not vitiate the Legislature's power to classify, which necessarily flows from its general power to enact regulations for the health, safety, and welfare of the community"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*145 Justice LAMB
Dissenting.
Because I believe that Act 91 1 is special legislation passed in violation of Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, I respectfully dissent. In promulgating Act 91, the Legislature has singled out the Harrisburg School District for special treatment, under the pretext of testing the efficacy of a “pilot program” for distressed systems of education. The amended Section 1707-B 2 targets Harrisburg in a less obvious way than the Reed Amendment, 3 and as drafted, could theoretically apply to both Harrisburg and Erie, as they are the only two cities meeting the form of government and population criteria. However, I do not agree that the mere possibility that the Erie School District might find itself distressed before December of 2005 mandates against a finding that Act 91 is special legislation.
Act 91’s classification is no less effective in singling out the Harrisburg School District for special treatment than the Reed Amendment. It is, in my view, nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt by the Legislature to promulgate special legislation under the guise of a general law. Were the purpose of this legislation really the remediation of failing urban school districts, such could have been achieved through the passage of general laws. The only possible purpose of Act 91 is the evasion of the constitutional limitation ran afoul of in Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Hickok (Hickok I), 563 Pa.391, 761 A.2d 1132 (2000). As such, it must fail.
By its opinion today, the majority has placed its imprimatur on legislation passed in disregard of the constitutional limitation contained in Article III, Section 32. Because I can not abide the Legislature’s evasion of the constitutional limitation contained therein, I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
. Act of November 22, 2000, P.L. 672, No. 91, § 9.
. Section 1707 B of the Act of May 10, 2000, P.L. 44, No. 16, § 8.1, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 17-1701-B to 17-1716-B.
. Section 1707 B of the Act of May 10, 2000, P.L. 44, No. 16, § 8.1, 24 P.S. §§ 17-1701-B to 17-1716-B.'