concluding that a “driver’s flight [from officers] ... reflected the mind set and activity of those with whom he was associated under somewhat suspicious conditions” and, along with other circumstances, justified “a brief detention of the men still in the car”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that a “driver’s flight [from officers] ... reflected the mind set and activity of those with whom he was associated under somewhat suspicious conditions” and, along with other circumstances, justified “a brief detention of the men still in the car”
- explaining that even an individual's flight from police "is insufficiently indicative of criminal activity to justify an investigatory stop solely on that basis”
- holding that "flight from authority implying consciousness of guilt-may be considered among other factors justifying a Terry seizure"
- concluding that a uniformed police officer’s command to "come here, police officer” was a Fourth Amendment seizure
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BELSON, Associate Judge,
joining in part and concurring in the result.
I am unable to join unreservedly in the opinion of the court. I remain of the view, expressed in my dissent from this division’s earlier opinion on this appeal, that we should not reach the issue of the legality of the stop of the driver because appellant failed to raise that issue either before the trial court or on appeal. Johnson v. United States, 468 A.2d 1325, 1329 (1983). It follows that we need not resolve the issue of standing.
I also have reservations about the opinion’s discussion of the issue of standing, Part II B. I think it not irrational to limit the reach of the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases to instances in which the authorities breached the rights of the accused, as distinguished from rights of some other person.
With those reservations, I express my agreement with the opinion’s application of the standing requirement and its determination of the effect of that application on the disposition of this appeal. Therefore I join in Parts II A, II C, and the portion of II B that holds that the police did not invade a legitimate expectation of privacy held by appellant.
I.