stating that “if the approach and questioning amounted to a seizure — i.e., physical’ force or a show of authority such that a reasonable person would not believe he was free to leave — that seizure would be unconstitutional, and thus the later, more formal detention and related frisk would bé as well” (quoting Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758)
How later courts described this case
- stating that “if the approach and questioning amounted to a seizure — i.e., physical’ force or a show of authority such that a reasonable person would not believe he was free to leave — that seizure would be unconstitutional, and thus the later, more formal detention and related frisk would bé as well” (quoting Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758)
- concluding that “a situation in which persons unfamiliar to the police are parked in a car late at night in a high crime area does not, without more, present specific, articulable facts warranting suspicion of criminal activity” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 468 A.2d 1325, 1327 (D.C.1983))
- officer’s request that defendant remove his hands from his pockets, “which was no more intrusive than a request for identification,” followed by two nonintimidating questions, asked without threats or indication of severe tone of voice, did not convert the consensual encounter into a seizure
- officer’s request that appel-lee remove his hands from his pockets, followed by two questions and voluntary answers, met the Supreme Court test under Royer for a pre-seizure, “consensual encounter”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PRYOR, Chief Judge,
concurring:
When viewed from the vantage point of a reasonable law enforcement officer, Peterkin v. United States, 281 A.2d 567, 568 (D.C.1971), the initial encounter in this case, whether consensual or not, was sup *1046 ported by sufficient articulable suspicion to justify the officer’s questioning, which, in turn, escalated to a frisk. While the officer would riot have been justified in frisking appellant initially, his subsequent response, based on evolving facts, was consistent with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Without accepting all that the majority opinion entails, I would reverse the suppression order.