The opinion
NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
While I accept that the Local Agency Law, Act of Dec. 2, 1968, 1133, 53 P.S. § 11301 et seq., conferred a right of review in a case such as this, Smith v. Richland School District, 36 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 150, 387 A.2d 974 (1978); Gabriel v. Trinity School Dist., 22 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 620, 350 A.2d 203 (1976), provided the proper procedure was followed to secure that right, 1 nevertheless, that right of review does not permit the courts of common pleas to redefine the standard of substantial difference on a case by case basis.
*475 The legislative formula in effect at the time of this suspension 2 intended to combine in the judgment the respective performances of the teachers considered as well as their length of service. 3
The underlying purpose of the Public School Code requires the public interest to have primacy over private interests. “School authorities must be given broad discretionary powers to ensure a better education for the children of this Commonwealth and any restrictions on the exercise of these powers must be strictly construed on the basis that the *476 public interest predominates and private interests are subordinate thereto: Walker et al. v. Scranton School District, [ 338 Pa. 104 , 12 A.2d 46 (1940)].” Smith v. Darby School District, 388 Pa. 301, 314 , 130 A.2d 661, 668-69 (1957). Accord, School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Twer, 498 Pa. 429 , 447 A.2d 222 (1982). Strict adherence to this cardinal legislative mandate dictates that the public interest requires the administrative process, in this instance the county superintendent, to determine what constitutes a “substantial difference” in rating between professional employees, rather than the judiciary. It has long been fundamental, in this jurisdiction, that courts are permitted to interfere with the exercise of discretion of a school district “only when it is made apparent that it is not discretion that is being exercised but arbitrary will or caprice.” Lamb v. Redding, 234 Pa. 481 , 83 A. 362 (1912). There is no basis for a deviation from that standard in this case.
In the case of appellant Holmes there was no dispute as to the facts. The legislature intended the superintendent to make the conclusory decision of what constituted a “substantial difference.” See 24 Pa.S.A. ll-1125(a) 4 And it is “presumptuous to superimpose judicial control upon the exercise of discretion by trained educators” who administered the evaluation process within the district. Smith v. Darby *477 School District, supra, quoting Regan et al. v. Stoddard et al., 361 Pa. 469, 474 , 65 A.2d 240, 242 (1949).
*476 (a) Whenever a board of school directors decreases the size of the staff of professional employes, the suspensions to be made shall be determined by the county superintendent of schools or the district superintendent, as the case may be, on the basis of efficiency rank determined by ratings made in accordance with standards and regulations, determined by rating cards prepared by the Department of Public Instruction, as required by section one thousand one hundred twenty-three of this act. It shall be the duty of boards of school directors to cause to be established a permanent record system, containing ratings for each professional employe employed within the district. Copies of all ratings for the year shall be transmitted to the professional employe upon his or her request, or, if any rating during the year is unsatisfactory, a copy of same shall be transmitted to the professional employe concerned. No professional employe shall be dismissed under this act unless such rating records have been kept on file by the board of school directors: Provided, That boards of school directors in *477 districts under supervision of the county superintendent may establish a filing system for rating cards in the office of the county superintendent of schools. [Footnote omitted.]
The Commonwealth Court, in Gabriel v. Trinity Sch. Dist., supra, stated “We recognize, of course, that the final delineation of the limits of the term ‘substantial difference’ in the context of efficiency ratings must be done on a case-by-case basis.” 22 Commonwealth Ct. at 628-29, 350 A.2d at 208 . Such a statement should not be taken to mean the courts are to determine on a case by case basis what is a “substantial difference” and replace the agency’s judgment with their judgment, under the guise of resolving disputed facts. Obviously, the body charged with designing and administering the rating procedure is best equipped to interpret the significance of the variations in the scores given.
The reasoning of the majority in the appeal of Carmody is even more strained. Appellant Carmody received an unweighted rating of 85, whereas the lowest unweighted rating among the retained teachers was 108, a difference of 23 points. Accepting the mystical figure of 16 points, embraced by the majority as demonstrating a “substantial difference”, 5 it would appear that the superintendent’s finding in that instance must be accepted. The majority attempts to avoid this result by challenging the rating process in this instance. The majority today rules that the failure to *478 produce anecdotal data justifies the vacation of a suspension. As a basis for the ruling, the majority relies upon a Commonwealth Court decision, New Castle Area School District v. Bair, 28 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 240, 368 A.2d 345 (1977), which found such failure fatal in the case of a dismissal. It is obvious to me that the distinction between a suspension and a dismissal for cause are distinctly different situations. Moreover, the application of such a rule even if appropriate in this situation would be improper absent a prior articulation of such a requirement. 6
McDERMOTT, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
. Here, appellant Carmody on July 24, 1976 requested a hearing. The request was denied on August 16, 1976. No appeal from this denial was taken, although one could have been taken within thirty days (September 16, 1976) to the court of common pleas. See 53 P.S. § 11307. Instead, appellants Carmody and Holmes filed a Com *475 plaint in Mandamus on November 4, 1976. Appellee offered a hearing to appellants on November 29, 1976. Appellants refused. However both parties requested a hearing de novo before the court of common pleas in the mandamus action. The Commonwealth Court found the posture of the case to be “as though it were a de novo local agency hearing appeal” although the lower court specifically stated “this case is not on appeal under the local agency law.” The majority agrees with the Commonwealth Court that “the posture of this case when it was brought to the common pleas court was a de novo hearing pursuant to an appeal from an adjudication of a local agency” (p. 966). It is interesting that the majority ignores the fact that the action in the court of common pleas was brought more than thirty days from the denial of a hearing and over 100 days after suspension.
. 24 Pa.S.A. § 11-1125. Suspensions and reinstatements; how made
* * ifc * * *
(b) In cases in which suspensions are to be made, professional employes shall be retained on the basis of seniority rights, acquired within the school district of current employment, where no differences in rating are found. Seniority rights shall also prevail where there is no substantial difference in rating. In cases where there are substantial differences in rating of those under consideration for suspension, seniority shall be given consideration in accordance with principles and standards of weighting incorporated in the rating cards. Where there is a merger, jointure or union district formed, all professional employes shall retain the seniority rights they had at the time of such merger, jointure of union.
. The mere fact that the formula was changed, to reflect only seniority, 24 Pa.S.A. § 11-1125.1 (Supp. 1981-82), does not address the wisdom of the formula which included the quality of performance of the employee. Since the purpose of the Public School Code was to ensure quality education, the quality of performance of professional employees was unquestionably a relevant factor to be considered in the suspension formula.
. 24 Pa.S.A. § 11-1125. Suspensions and reinstatements; how made
. The majority based its opinion on dealing with 8 points out of a possible 160 points because the unweighted efficiency rating was computed by (1) rating the teachers twice a year on a scale of 0 to 80 points with 80 being the highest possible rating and (2) adding the totals of both ratings. Slip Op. n. 7, n. 8, pp. 4, 6. We do not agree that a “substantial difference” can be determined by choosing a designated number from the highest possible score. Rather the difference between the lowest actual rating and the highest actual rating of those being considered for suspension should first be obtained. Then a number reflective of quality of performance as well as a quantitative comparison of score should be used as the guide for determining a “substantial difference” between the scores of the suspended teacher and the retained teacher. In this case, appellant Holmes had the lowest unweighted score of 48 + 47 or 95 while Mrs. Ross had the highest unweighted score of 61 + 57 or 118. The *478 lowest retained teacher, Mr. Semion, had an unweighted score of 106. Out of an actual difference of 23 points between the highest and lowest unweighted scores, the difference between Ms. Carmody and Mr. Semion of 11 points must be said to be substantial.
. In Bair, 28 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 240, 368 A.2d 345 (1977), the court was faced with a situation of a dismissal because of an unsatisfactory rating and persistent negligence. In such a case, under section 1127 of the Code, 24 Pa.S.A. § 11-1127, a hearing is required if the dismissal is contested. The standardized Department of Education form DEBE-333 requires the support of anecdotal records in the case of unsatisfactory ratings. To require the keeping of anecdotal records when a rating is satisfactory unduly burdens the record keeping aspect of school districts, both in terms of consumption of time and financially.