The opinion
DuckETT, J.,
specially assigned, filed the following dissenting opinion.
I regret that I cannot agree completely with the opinion written by Chief Judge Bruñe in this unusual divorce case.
It seems clear from the testimony that the original desertion by the wife on January 15, 1959 was voluntary and deliberate on her part. However, I conclude from the testimony that the eighteen months’ separation period was interrupted when the wife returned on September 8 or approximately eight months after the original separation.
In the first place, it must be recognized that the wife had the absolute right to return to the home. This property belonged to her as much as it did to the husband, so she was therefore entirely within her legal rights in returning.
Secondly, in order to obtain an absolute divorce on the grounds of abandonment or desertion for eighteen months, the plaintiff, in addition to proving that the defendant deliberately left him, must prove that the abandonment has con *219 tinued uninterruptedly for at least eighteen months and is deliberate and final and the separation of the parties beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation. Thurlow v. Thurlow, 212 Md. 222 ; Miller v. Miller, 153 Md. 213 . Stated another way, in order to constitute desertion as a ground for an absolute divorce, separation and an intent to desert must coexist during the entire eighteen months’ period. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 127 Md. 617 .
Third, as Judge Henderson, speaking for the Court recently said in Stecher v. Stecher, 226 Md. 155 , at 159:
“* * * Marriage imposes a duty to bear and forbear and to cherish in sickness and in health. It is not to be terminated for light causes or merely because of a desire to escape from an unpleasant and unhappy environment.”
Fourth, the husband’s improper actions were such as not to encourage the Chancellor to grant him relief, especially as the State has a vital interest in maintaining the marriage status which may not be dissolved except for grave and weighty causes.
Finally, our law encourages estranged spouses to reconcile their differences and to resume marriage relations. Therefore, during the eighteen months’ period the duty rests upon each spouse to accept any offer made in good faith by the other to resume suspended cohabitation, if it appears that such offer may be accepted without any reasonable sacrifice of self respect, health, safety or comfort. Hite v. Hite, 210 Md. 576 .
The testimony in this case is uncontradicted that the husband made no attempt to encourage his wife to return after she left in January. The testimony is also uncontradicted that the wife actually returned on September 8th. Under the circumstances, can her actions at that time be considered an attempt to resume the marital relation? The fact that the wife had little or nothing to say to her husband upon returning can be logically explained on either of the following grounds:
(1) She was mentally deranged at the time or (2) her husband’s brutal and inhuman actions left little for her to say, *220 and prevented a reconciliation. Upon finding that his wife had returned, he pushed her, took her pocketbook and keys and shortly thereafter called in two policemen in an attempt to have her removed from the premises. The next day, although the wife had caused no trouble and had offered to prepare his lunch, he illegally swore out a warrant for her arrest. That evening the wife was removed forcibly from her home by the police and immediately thereafter committed to Spring Grove State Hospital by two physicians obtained by the husband.
The legal effect of this commitment under Code 1957, Art. 59, § 31 presumably made by two qualified physicians after separate examinations is that the wife was insane and that the disease required her to be placed in a hospital where the insane are detained for care and treatment. The wife remained in this Institution from September 10, 1959 to July, 1960, although she was permitted to leave during week-ends after the first two or three months.
Even though the desertion of the husband by the wife was originally wilful, the period which she was confined involuntarily in an insane asylum must be excluded in determining whether the desertion continued for the requisite period. In other words, by the great weight of authority, the continuity of the desertion is legally interrupted.
Annotation, 19 A.L.R. 2d, 144 , 167; 4 A.L.R. 1333 ;
Dorsey v. Dorsey, 90 App. D. C. 284, 195 F. 2d 567 ;
Cox v. Cox, 268 Ala. 572 , 109 So. 2d 703 ;
Hartwell v. Hartwell, 234 Mass. 250 , 125 N. E. 208 ;
Schouler, Marriage and Divorce, 6th Ed., p. 1837, § 1621;
Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, 2nd Ed., § 4.11, p. 82;
Pipitone v. Pipitone, 97 N. J. Eq. 35, 127 A. 164 ;
Wright v. Wright, 125 Va. 526 , 99 S. E. 515 ;
See also: Bowersock v. Bowersock, 210 Md. 427, p. 438 ;
Noellert v. Noellert, 169 Md. 559, p. 562 ;
Kruse v. Kruse, 179 Md. 657, p. 663 ;
17 Am. Jur. § 97, p. 318, § 183, p. 380.
If for some reason, not apparent from the transcript, the Chancellor discounted the effect of the physician’s commitment, it is nevertheless clear that the husband’s suit must fail. *221 Under such circumstances, the husband’s actions were improper in having his wife arrested, evicted and committed. He, as well as the wife, had a duty to effect a reconciliation if reasonably possible. We find from the testimony, however, (1) that the husband admits that he stopped loving his wife the day she left in January, 1959; (2) that although he knew his wife was ill in the hospital, he refused to visit her for two or three weeks, although she phoned as soon as she could obtain permission and pleaded with him to come; (3) that when the wife told him at the hospital that she loved him, he replied, “Anne, I’m through—I’ve got nothing else to do with you”; (4) that he refused to assist in having her released from the Hospital; (5) that he gave her little or no money during her illness and after her release; (6) after the wife left the Institution, the husband stated that he would not have her back under any circumstances and, at the trial, testified that he would not agree to a reconciliation.
The wife’s actions, although erratic, were always upright and sincere. Pier testimony, although rambling and confusing, was honest and unimpeached.
The husband’s actions were not sincere and were, in some instances, reprehensible. In addition to what has been previously stated, he changed the locks on the house; moved four members of his family into the home, thereby preventing his wife from returning; failed to pay the meager board required at the Institution, while at the same time, purchasing an expensive automobile and failing to pay his income tax.
I must conclude, therefore, that the bill of complaint should be dismissed and husband ordered to pay permanent alimony to the wife.