”[T]he Commonwealth or its subdivisions and instrumentalities cannot be estopped 'by the acts of its agents and employees if those acts are outside the agent's powers, in violation of positive law, or acts which require legislative or executive action.' As a result, ‘[pjersons contracting with a governmental agency must, at their peril, know the extent of the power of its officers making the contract.’"
How later courts described this case
- ”[T]he Commonwealth or its subdivisions and instrumentalities cannot be estopped 'by the acts of its agents and employees if those acts are outside the agent's powers, in violation of positive law, or acts which require legislative or executive action.' As a result, ‘[pjersons contracting with a governmental agency must, at their peril, know the extent of the power of its officers making the contract.’"
- the Commonwealth or its subdivisions and instrumentalities cannot be estopped by the acts of its agents if those acts are outside the agent’s powers, in violation of positive law, or acts which require legislative or executive action
- Liquor Control Board was not statutorily authorized to enter into a lease for warehouse space that barred recovery by warehouse owner on the basis of estoppel
- the doctrine of estoppel may be applied against a municipality based upon a municipal official’s act, but not if those acts are “outside the agent’s power” or “in violation of positive law”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
Unlike the majority, I am satisfied that the order of the Board of Claims granting appellant relief should be sustained. Our Legislature has long given the Board of Claims broad jurisdiction to “adjust and settle claims against the Commonwealth . . ..” The Fiscal Code, Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 343, § 1003, 72 P.S. § 1003 (1949). As this Court observed in Lowry v. Commonwealth, 365 Pa. 474, 479 , 76 A.2d 363, 366 (1950), the authority of the Board of Claims to provide redress is not limited to instances where parties have “express contracts with the Commonwealth or its agencies.” Rather, it extends to “virtually every type of claim. . . ” Here, the record demonstrates a sound exercise of discretion. Although the Board declined to award appellant lost profits on its proposed lease agreement with the Liquor Control Board, see Administrative Code of 1929, Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, § 2402(d), as amended, 71 P.S. § 632(d) (1962), it could and did reasonably conclude that in fairness the Commonwealth should pay appellant monies appellant expended to prepare the premises for the Liquor Control Board. I would, therefore, reinstate the order of the Board of Claims.