holding that there was no contempt where the defendant’s conduct was not clearly and specifically prohibited by the court’s ruling
How later courts described this case
- holding that there was no contempt where the defendant’s conduct was not clearly and specifically prohibited by the court’s ruling
- noting that where “the federal statute is identical in all material respects to the Pennsylvania ... statute, this Court looks to federal decisions for guidance in interpreting” the Pennsylvania statute
- defense attorney’s objection to court’s direction that defendant stand to be identified by a witness, and subsequent inquiry as to whether his client was to be “flagellated” in front of the jury deemed not sufficient to sustain a conviction for criminal contempt
- this Court acknowledged that attorney’s behavior was offensive throughout the trial, but decision to reverse contempt conviction was solely based upon attorney’s remark which triggered the issuance of the contempt citation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MANDERINO, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the opinion of the Court; however, I do not endorse the holding of all cases from other jurisdictions cited therein. In some of those cases, conduct which clearly did not constitute contempt was held to be contemptuous. Secondly, I do not agree that any of appellant’s conduct in this case could have constituted contempt under subsection II of the Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784 § 23, 17 P.S. § 2041 (1962). Subsection II is limited to the failure to comply with a formal order, see In re Johnson, 467 Pa. 552, 556 , 359 A.2d 739, 741 (1976).