holding that the real estate exception “can be applied only to those cases where it is alleged the artificial condition or defect of the land itself causes the injury, not merely when it facilitates the injury by the acts of others, whose acts are outside the statute’s scope of liability”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the real estate exception “can be applied only to those cases where it is alleged the artificial condition or defect of the land itself causes the injury, not merely when it facilitates the injury by the acts of others, whose acts are outside the statute’s scope of liability”
- interpreting the real estate exception to local agency immunity under the PSTCA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(3), to apply “only to those cases where it is alleged that the artificial condition or defect of the land itself causes injury, not merely when it facilitates injury by acts of others, whose acts are outside [the PSTCA’s] scope of liability”
- concluding that real estate exception to sovereign immunity did not apply to negligence claim against juvenile detention center after detainee escaped and caused injuries
- reasoning that Section 8542(b)(3) “must be narrowly interpreted given the expressed legislative intent to insulate political subdivisions from tort liability”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Burgan v. City of Pittsburgh, 115 Pa. Commw. 566 (1988)
514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118 (1987), casts serious doubt over the continuing validity of our decision in
Distinguished
Distinguished by Brewington, S. v. Phila. Sch. Dist., Aplt., 199 A.3d 348 (2018)
Accordingly, our decision in Mascaro , and the cases relied upon therein, are plainly distinguishable from the situation sub judice , where the School's unprotected concrete gym wall directly caused the alleged injury, and its condition did not merely facilitate an injury caused by the act of others (i.e., third parties).
Distinguished by Wilson v. Norristown Area School District, 42 Pa. D. & C.4th 160 (1999)
Citing Mascaro for the proposition that the real property exception is inapplicable as a basis of a claim of negligence grounded upon failure to supervise the conduct of students or persons adequately, the court held, “[i]t is clear that Faber’s allegations of negligence in . . . the complaint deal with conduct of district employees in supervising the race and are not all
The opinion
HUTCHINSON, Justice,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion. I agree that the real estate exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(3), contemplates recovery only for the artificial condition or defect of the land itself and does not impose liability upon government entities for the acts of third parties. I write separately to emphasize that, on these facts, a proximate cause analysis would insulate appellants from liability for negligence. The appellants’ negligence, in failing to properly secure a juvenile detention center, may have been the cause-in-fact of the injuries suffered by the appellees. However, appellants’ omissions are not the legal cause of the harm due to the intervening criminal acts of Opher. Both cause-in-fact and legal causation must be present for a plaintiff to recover on a negligence theory.