holding that state and local regulation “must not have the effect of foreclosing or restricting the railroad’s ability to conduct its operations or otherwise unreasonably burdening interstate commerce” (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding that state and local regulation “must not have the effect of foreclosing or restricting the railroad’s ability to conduct its operations or otherwise unreasonably burdening interstate commerce” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- noting the Transportation Board's position that: (1) "while state and local government entities . . . retain certain police powers and may apply non-discriminatory regulation to protect public health and safety, their actions must not have the effect of foreclosing or restricting the railroad's ability to conduct its operations or otherwise unreasonably burdening interstate commerce"; and (2) "railroads are exempt from the traditional permitting process but not . . . from most other generally applicable laws"
- finding a nuisance claim related to the noise and air pollution produced by a rail facility to be preempted by the ICCTA
- Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, specifically 49 U.S.C. § 10501[b] [1996], "does not preempt `non-discriminatory' public health and safety regulations that do not foreclose or restrict a railroad's ability to conduct its operations"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LONG, J.,
dissenting.
I would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division requiring this matter to proceed before the STB, the agency authorized by Congress to implement the ICCTA. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10501 . Nothing in the after-decided Riverdale case, supra, justifies a different outcome. 1999 WL 715272 . By its own terms, the STB’s ruling in Riverdale is preliminary only; it is subject to change depending on a full review of the facts. Id. at *8 . Indeed, as the STB itself acknowledged, there may be additional unresolved preemption issues in Riverdale. Id. at *1 n. 2. Our ruling here is premature and out of conformity, not only with the principles of preemption, but with the well-established rule that litigation is to proceed in a cohesive, and not piecemeal, manner.
In Riverdale, the STB acknowledged that state and local entities “retain certain police powers,” so long as their actions do not “have the effect of foreclosing or restricting the railroad’s ability to conduct its operations or otherwise unreasonably burdening] interstate commerce.” Id. at *5-6 . That agency refused, however, to detail which powers it retained and which it ceded “without more information as to the particular police power issues that may be involved in this case.” Id. at *6 .
This case should be heard in the first instance by the STB. After a preemption determination by that agency based on these particularized facts, the actual contours of the state case will be clear; at that time, meaningful action may be taken by local authorities subject to state judicial review. In my view, the *464 majority has created a haphazard scheme for addressing the difficult issue presented by this ease.
GARIBALDI and VERNIERO, JJ., join in Justice LONG’S opinion.
For modification and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices O’HERN, STEIN and COLEMAN — 4.
For affirmance — Justices GARIBALDI, LONG and VERNIERO — 3.