requiring showing by preponderance of the evidence
How later courts described this case
- requiring showing by preponderance of the evidence
- applicants admitted after convictions on various criminal offenses
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FERREN, Associate Judge,
with whom ROGERS, Associate Judge, joins, concurring:
I join in Judge Belson’s opinion for the court, except for Part IV. Judge Belson attempts — as well as anyone could — to demonstrate why admission of someone to the bar who has been convicted of a felony is not inconsistent with the law requiring permanent disbarment of a lawyer who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. I believe, however, that the distinction is strained. I have difficulty with the idea that a lawyer has a higher obligation than a lay person not to violate the law. But, even if there is merit to that idea, I do not believe it should serve, in any way, to justify admission of a convicted felon to the bar when public policy holds— as it does in the District of Columbia — that the same person, if convicted of the same crime after admission, would have to be disbarred permanently. I believe the same policy, whether eligibility to apply (or reapply) for a lawyer’s license, or permanent ineligibility to practice law, should apply in both situations.
I have no difficulty with approving the admissions of Messrs. Manville, Strauss, and Brooks, however, because I believe this court’s interpretation of the so-called permanent disbarment statute, D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) (1981), is wrong. See In re Kerr, 424 A.2d 94 (D.C.1980) (en banc). As *1138 I tried to demonstrate a number of years ago, that statute does not preclude an application for reinstatement. Id. at 99 (Fer-ren, J., dissenting). 1 Thus, I conclude that, upon a proper showing of rehabilitation— which I believe should be a very high hurdle — one convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude is eligible for admission to the bar or for readmission after disbarment, as the case may be.
On the record before us, I am satisfied that Messrs. Manville, Brooks, and Strauss have demonstrated the necessary rehabilitation, as well as a present fitness for the practice of law, to justify their admission to the bar.
.See also In re Wolff, 511 A.2d 1047 (D.C.1986) ("Several members of the court would reconsider the permanent disbarment holding in In re Kerr, 424 A.2d 94 (D.C.1980) (en banc).”).