The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Montgomery, J.:
The board found as a fact that “The claimant ivas not employed in an occupation having a silica hazard from 1924 to 1931 and from 1944 to May 31, 1963.” In support of this finding the record clearly shows that from 1944 to 1949, the claimant did mechanical work and from 1949 to 1963 he worked in defendant’s warehouse. As a mechanic he repaired drills, air compressors, tractors and shovels. As a warehouseman, he “cleaned up, took inventory and moved stuff around”, which occupations, as also found by the board, are general in nature and are not recognized as having a silica hazard. The majority rules out the claimant’s own testimony that the only dust in the warehouse “was household type and from the cats (caterpillars)”, but in my opinion, this was competent evidence for -the board’s consideration which together with the other evidence as to the general nature of cláimant’s occupation supported its finding that claimant’s occupational disease did not arise out of and in the course of his employment by appellee within four years from the day on which his disability arose.
*468 The majority relies on a presumption, but a presumption of fact gives way the moment proof to the. contrary is presented. Heath v. Klosterman, 343 Pa. 501 , 23 A. 2d 209 (1941).
If claimant is entitled to recover in this case, every, stenographer, clerk or other .person, doing general work in an office of an anthracite coal company, regardless' of how many miles away from the mines or coal operation the office may be, would be entitled to the same consideration. I do not believe the Legislature intended such a'broad construction of Section 301(f) of the Occupational Disease Act.
I would affirm the board and lower court on the authority of Scott v. United States Steel Corporation, 203 Pa. Superior Ct. 459 , 201 A. 2d 243 (1964), and Jaloneck v. Jarecki Manufacturing Co., 157 Pa. Superior Ct. 609 , 43 A. 2d 430 (1945).
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Wright, J., joins in this dissent.