allowance of visitation comports with the Act's express purpose of preserving the family
How later courts described this case
- allowance of visitation comports with the Act's express purpose of preserving the family
- “Visitation has been limited or denied only where the parent has been shown to suffer from severe mental or moral deficiencies that constitute a grave threat to the child.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WIEAND, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority’s decision to remand for further proceedings. However, I do so because the lapse of time commands that another hearing be held and not because I find error in the trial court’s determination of January 21, 1981.
The court’s order of April 16, 1980 is moot. This order denied to appellants the right of visitation with their child, who had been previously adjudicated dependent, until September 3, 1980. That date has now passed, and the court’s order has been superseded by an order of January 21, 1981. This later order, entered after three separate hearings, deferred future visitations until further order of the court. The later order is properly the subject of appellate review; but no good purpose can be served by reviewing and/or reversing the earlier order.
The “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof has been imposed by the Supreme Court of the United States upon proceedings to terminate rights of parents to their natural children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The standard for adjudicating a child dependent is also “clear and convincing evidence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c). Moreover, even after a child has been adjudicated dependent, he or she may not be removed from the custody of his or her parents except in cases of “clear necessity.” In the Interest of Ryan Michael C., 294 Pa.Super. 417, 421 , 440 A.2d 535, 536 (1982); In the Interest of Pernishek, 268 Pa.Super. 447, 457 , 408 A.2d 872, 877 (1979). However, once the child has been adjudged dependent and taken from the parents, issues of custody and visitation must be determined according to the child’s best interests. In re Bennage, 303 Pa.Super. 318, *300 320 , 449 A.2d 707, 708 (1982); Stapleton et al. v. Dauphin County Child Care Service et al., 228 Pa.Super. 371, 391 , 324 A.2d 562, 572 (1974). Nevertheless, a parent is rarely denied the right to visit his or her child. In re: the Matter of Lisa and Cynthia, 287 Pa.Super. 255, 259 , 429 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1981); Lewis v. Lewis, 271 Pa.Super. 519, 522 , 414 A.2d 375, 376 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 877 , 101 S.Ct. 221 , 66 L.Ed.2d 99 (1980); Commonwealth ex rel. Peterson v. Hayes, 252 Pa.Super. 487, 490 , 381 A.2d 1311, 1312 (1977) (plurality opinion); Fernald v. Fernald, 224 Pa.Super. 93, 95 , 302 A.2d 470, 471 (1973). Generally, visitation will be denied or limited only where there are severe mental or moral deficiencies of the parent which are shown to be gravely detrimental to the welfare of the child. In re: the Matter of Lisa and Cynthia, supra, 287 Pa.Super. at 260 , 429 A.2d at 1199 ; Lewis v. Lewis, supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Sorace v. Sorace, 236 Pa.Super. 42, 44 , 344 A.2d 553, 554 (1975); Commonwealth ex rel. Peterson v. Hayes, supra.
I am unable to agree with the writer of the lead opinion that the record discloses a lack of competent evidence to support the hearing court’s determination that immediate visitations would have been gravely detrimental to the child. There clearly was competent evidence to support such a finding. The credibility and weight of that evidence were for the trier of the facts. I would accept the finding of the hearing judge, who saw and heard the witnesses and concluded that “the child would be in serious emotional and physical danger in the custody of the parents, and even visitation at this time would be seriously detrimental to the child.” •
' Were it not for the fact that nearly two years have passed since the order which deferred the parents’ right to visit their child was entered, I would simply affirm the hearing court’s order. However, the passage of time suggests most strongly that additional evidence is now required and that' appellants’ asserted rights of visitation be recon *301 sidered in the light of such additional evidence. I would remand for that purpose only.