wherein we upheld the WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant’s discharge did not result from his lack of a good faith and, thus, entitled him to reinstatement of total disability benefits
How later courts described this case
- wherein we upheld the WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant’s discharge did not result from his lack of a good faith and, thus, entitled him to reinstatement of total disability benefits
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
COLINS, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In the context of a reinstatement petition, where a partially disabled claimant has been laid off or discharged from his employment and is now seeking a reinstatement of total disability benefits, the claimant’s burden is to show that his condition has worsened such that he can no longer perform the light-duty work to which he was assigned before he was discharged. Barnett v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Paul Riggle & Sons), 718 A.2d 901 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 559 Pa. 680 , 739 A.2d 544 (1999); Kane v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Weis Markets, Inc.), 682 A.2d 17 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996). “In workers’] compensation reinstatement proceedings, benefits are reinstated or denied based solely on the status of the work-related injury.” Bortz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Reznor Division of FL Industries), 546 Pa. 77, 82 , 683 A.2d 259, 262 (1996); Barnett . The issue of the claimant’s fault in the context of the discharge from employment “is not generally relevant to the initial assessment of whether the claimant’s burden of establishing a loss of earnings capacity attributable to a work-related injury has been satisfied.” Vista International Hotel v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Daniels), 560 Pa. 12 , 742 A.2d 649, 657 (1999). 1
In this case, the Board, and not the judge, applied the correct burden of proof, and the Board did not err in its conclusion that Champion failed to meet his burden. As Champion argues, Dr. Maoor’s credited medical testimony establishes that his condition had worsened and that it would never improve; however, Dr. Maoor never testified, either directly or impliedly, that
Champion was unable to perform the duties of his light-duty position. Dr. Ma-oor did testify that Champion could not return to his preinjury work; he also testified on cross-examination that he encouraged Champion to look for employment that did not include high-demand activities involving his knee.
Because issues of a claimant’s misconduct or fault in the context of his discharge have nothing to do with the determination of the status of his work injury, the Court need not address Champion’s argument as it relates to the Board’s conclusion that Champion was discharged for cause. In *342 my view, the Board did not usurp the s determination authority in so excluding; rathe, the Board concluded tht the judge absed his discretion in makin, determination on the issues of fault andjr misconduct. The Board went on to fínl substantial evidence of record would support a finding that Champion was discharged for cause.
Accordingly, I would affirm the Board’s order.
. “The holding of Hertz-Penske [Truck Leasing Company v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Bowers), 546 Pa. 257 , 684 A.2d 547 (1996),] that fault is not relevant to the initial determination of whether the claimant’s loss of earnings capacity is due to a work-related injury is tempered ... by enactments and related decisions implicating competing public policy concerns!,]” such as precluding compensation for intentionally self-inflicted injuries and those caused by the claimant’s violation of law. Vista International, 560 Pa. at 26 n. 9, 742 A.2d at 656 n. 9.