rejecting the appellant's challenge to the trial court's admission of victim impact testimony, inter alia , on the basis that the jury did not find any of the proffered mitigating circumstances, and, thus, failed to demonstrate prejudice
How later courts described this case
- rejecting the appellant's challenge to the trial court's admission of victim impact testimony, inter alia , on the basis that the jury did not find any of the proffered mitigating circumstances, and, thus, failed to demonstrate prejudice
- recognizing that “[t]he proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 do not apply to searches and seizures conducted by private individuals”
- rejecting the appellant's argument that the admission of victim impact testimony is "violative of the due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment clauses" of the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions
- indicating that “additional invasions of privacy by [ ] government agent[s] following a private search must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice NIGRO
concurring.
I join the majority’s opinion in its entirety with the exception of the statements contained in footnote 16. As the majority correctly concludes, the trial court’s exclusion of “third party impact” evidence in the instant case did not run afoul of Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 , *532 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), nor does this type of evidence fall within any of the eight specific mitigating circumstances outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(l)-(8). However, I cannot join the majority’s dicta in footnote 16 because, in my estimation, it advances the proposition that “third party impact” evidence could actually be used as aggravating evidence to justify imposing the death penalty. It is clear to me, though, that such evidence has no place in our capital sentencing scheme as aggravating evidence, an observation affirmed by the fact that this evidence is not included within the statutory aggravating circumstances that permit the imposition of the death penalty in this Commonwealth. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(1)—(18). While I recognize that the thoughts expressed in footnote 16 are not part of the reasoning used in rejecting Appellant’s substantive claim, for the foregoing reasons, I cannot join that portion of the majority opinion.
Justice CAPPY joins in this concurring opinion.