finding plaintiff damaged by non-pecuniary losses, such as deprivation of liberty while in confinement, humiliation, estrangement from his family and friends, and a broken engagement due to his incarceration
How later courts described this case
- finding plaintiff damaged by non-pecuniary losses, such as deprivation of liberty while in confinement, humiliation, estrangement from his family and friends, and a broken engagement due to his incarceration
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WHITAKER, Judge
(concurring).
The unjust conviction statute requires that the certificate of innocence be issued by the court having jurisdiction to try that fact. A court hearing a petition for habeas corpus has no jurisdiction to pass on the petitioner’s guilt or innocence.
However, it necessarily follows from the court’s finding in this case that the Court Martial had no- jurisdiction to try plaintiff because his enlistment had expired when the offense charged was committed, that plaintiff could not have been guilty of the particular offenses charged, except one. Those offenses were: (1) disobeying the orders of his superior officers; (2) desertion; (3) conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline; (4) breaking arrest; (5) unauthorized absence; and (6) drunkenness. Since on habeas corpus it was held that plaintiff’s enlistment had expired when these alleged offenses were committed, plaintiff could not have been guilty of any of them, except the last.
Plaintiff could have been guilty of the drunkenness charge, although his enlistment had expired. I think, though, in the interests of justice, this charge may be disregarded. I have no doubt plaintiff would never have been charged with this offense had he not been charged with the others. They just “threw the book at him.”
While technically the habeas corpus court did not have the right to try plaintiff’s guilt or innocence, yet, since the effect of its holding was to find plaintiff innocent, I think, under a liberal construction of the statute, it had the right to issue the certificate.
It will be noted that under the first provision of the statute it was not necessary that the district judge find that the acts were not committed, but only that *866 an offense was not committed. That court had jurisdiction to hold that an offense was not committed; in fact, in granting habeas corpus, it necessarily held that plaintiff was innocent of any offense since it was shown that he was not in the military service at the time of the alleged acts. The court, therefore, had complete jurisdiction to hold that he was innocent of any offense, and could, therefore, certify to that fact.
It does not follow from this that it would have jurisdiction to do so as to all offenses.
Under subdivision 2, offenses against State law are included, but under State law no offense was committed unless the charge of drunkenness is to be regarded as such an offense as would preclude an otherwise meritorious action.
Giving the statute a liberal construction, as I think should be done in this case, I think the court’s .decision is correct, and I concur.
JONES, Chief Judge, concurs in the foregoing opinion.
LARAMORE, Judge, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.