holding that where information obtained from illegal warrantless search of a briefcase was used to establish probable cause for the warrant to search briefcase, evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant was properly suppressed
How later courts described this case
- holding that where information obtained from illegal warrantless search of a briefcase was used to establish probable cause for the warrant to search briefcase, evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant was properly suppressed
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ADELE HEDGES, Justice,
concurring.
While I concur with the majority opinion and join in its disposition, I write separately to respond to the dissent’s argument. I also endorse a method of “just resolution” of this and similar cases.
The dissent would exempt the State from the long-standing common law rule that in criminal cases, failure by the trial court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law, even when requested, is not error, citing the concurrence is State v. Ross. See 32 S.W.3d at 859-60 (Womack, *669 J., concurring). I believe that this position is based on an unwarranted limitation of Ross. The concurrence in that opinion states:
The simple and correct resolution of this recurring problem is to say that, when the party that is challenging a trial court’s ruling fails to request findings of fact, an appellate court will not reverse a ruling that could be reasonably based on adverse findings of fact.
Id. Note that the concurrence refers to the party, not the State. To use this reasoning to support the argument that the trial court commits reversible error when it denies the State’s request for findings, as opposed to any party’s request, is simply incorrect.
I agree with the Ross concurrence that a “just resolution” requires the imposition of a new rule that “the failure to make findings of fact, on request that was timely presented and refused over objection, is an independent ground for reversal of the trial court’s judgment ...” 1 The opinion cites Tex.R. Civ. P. 297 and 299 as analogous rules for civil cases, and implieity reasons that the distinction between civil and criminal procedure in this instance is nonsensical. The logic of its position is unassailable. Why should we rely on implicit trial court findings to support a ruling in the criminal arena, where life and liberty are at stake, when we require specific findings upon request in the civil area, where often only property is at stake?
. On a practical note, I would prefer that appellate courts have the authority to abate criminal cases for trial court findings, rather than reverse and remand. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768, 773 (Tex.1989).