Opinion

In Re the Appeal From the Final Decision of the South Dakota Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Division, for Fickbohm

  • 323 N.W.2d 133
  • 1982 S.D. LEXIS 368
Court
South Dakota Supreme Court
Filed
Aug 18, 1982
Status
Published
Author
Wollman
On the bench
Fosheim, Henderson, Wollman, Dunn, Morgan
Cited by
4 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.4%

we agree with the Pennsylvania courts that fulfillment of parental responsibilities and duties is a substantial and reasonable basis for refusing to accept a job

How later courts described this case

  • we agree with the Pennsylvania courts that fulfillment of parental responsibilities and duties is a substantial and reasonable basis for refusing to accept a job

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

WOLLMAN, Chief Justice

(concurring specially).

Unlike the situation that was presented to us in Red Bird v. Meierhenry, 314 N.W.2d 95 (S.D.1982), as the majority opinion points out, there is no definition of “good cause” as that term is used in SDCL 61-6-15. The Department of Labor argues that we should look to the provisions of SDCL 61-6-16 and 61-6-17 as limitations upon the grounds that would constitute good cause for refusing to apply for or accept suitable work. *

*137 In construing statutes similar to SDCL 61-6-15, 61-6-16, and 61-6-17, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held:

A careful study of § 402(a) has convinced us that “good cause” and “suitable work” are intended to be separate and distinct concepts, and that in determining eligibility for unemployment compensation each must be considered separate and apart from the other. It is well settled, that in construing a statute, effect shall be given if possible, to all its provisions .... It is impossible to give a general definition of “good cause.” The meaning of those words must be determined in each case from the facts of that ease. We are convinced that “good cause” was intended to cover reasons which are personal to the employee and extraneous to the employment if they are, as said by the learned Superior Court in Sturdevant Unemployment Comp. Case, 158 Pa.Super. 548 , 45 A.2d 898, 903 , “Real not imaginary, substantial not trifling, reasonable not whimsical, circumstances [which] compel the decision to leave employment” or to refuse suitable work. But in addition, “good cause” must be so interpreted that the fundamental purpose of the legislation shall not be destroyed.

Barclay White Co. v. Unemploy. Comp. Bd. of Rev., Etc., 356 Pa. 43 , 50 A.2d 336, 339-40 (1947).

We have elected to follow the Pennsylvania approach. If the legislature should decide that our interpretation is not in keeping with legislative intent, then it will be a simple enough job for the legislature to define, as it did in the statute under consideration in Red Bird v. Meierhenry, supra, “good cause,” as that term is used in SDCL 61-6-15, in a more restrictive manner than we have done in this opinion.

I agree with the majority opinion that the record before us does not warrant a reversal of the department’s decision.

SDCL 61-6-16 reads as follows:

In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the department shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his experience and prior earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation, and the distance of the available work from his residence.

SDCL 61-6-17 reads as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied under this title to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions:

(1) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute;

(2) If the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favor *137 able to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality;

(3) If, as a condition of being employed, the individual would be required to join or to resign from or refrain from joining any labor organization.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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