The opinion
M. J. Kelly, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent.
While I agree that there was substantial evidence showing that defendant was the perpetrator of the similar bad act and while I agree that the defendant’s identity was a material issue of fact at trial, I am not persuaded that the charged offense and the similar act share a "high degree of similarity” or are "marked with special characteristics so uncommon, peculiar and distinctive as to lead compellingly to the conclusion that [both] were the handiwork of the defendant”. People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298, 325 ; 319 NW2d 518 (1982). I find the similarities between the acts in this case no more compelling than the similarity between the *713 acts in Golochowicz and I would reverse on this issue.
I concur in the majority’s refusal to find abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of the blood-type evidence. While I continue to believe that blood-type evidence is generally inadmissible to show that a defendant is among 20% of the population sharing the victim’s blood-type and admissible where defendant is among only 2% or 3% of the population, People v Sturdivant, 91 Mich App 128 ; 283 NW2d 669 , lv den 407 Mich 933 (1979); People v White, 102 Mich App 156 ; 301 NW2d 837 (1980), I am also persuaded that 12% falls within that gray area best left to the discretion of the trial court. See, also, People v Hayden, 125 Mich App 650, 661 ; 337 NW2d 258 (1983).
I also concur in the majority’s resolution of defendant’s double jeopardy claim.