finding that the enactment of a charter statute makes prior caselaw discussing charter amendments obsolete
How later courts described this case
- finding that the enactment of a charter statute makes prior caselaw discussing charter amendments obsolete
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LEEDY, J.
(concurring). — I concur in all that is said in the principal opinion except as to the reasoning by which it is held that the provisions of § 16, Art. IX of the Constitution of 1875' (in effect when relator’s charter was originally adopted), when coupled with the somewhat similar provisions of § 20, Art. YI of the 1945 Constitution, constitute “foregoing provisions” within the meaning of the first sentence of the section and article last mentioned, 1 which section authorizes amendments to city charters and outlines the procedure to submit and adopt the same. Such conclusion is based, in substantial measure, upon the finding and declaration that § 20, Art. VI of the Constitution of 1945 “contains no reference to any certain section or to any certain Constitution.” To this I cannot agree. A more direct reference to the immediately preceding section (§ 19) of that article of that very Constitution would be hard to imagine. § 19 is the first section dealing with municipal government under special charters. I do not think a jot or tittle would have been added to or detracted from the sense or meaning of the sentence in question had it read: “Amendments of any city charter adopted under § 19 of this Constitution,” etc. It will be noted that § 22, Art. YI, in express and direct terms, denies to the legislature the authority to create or fix the powers, duties or compensation of any municipal office or employment “for any city framing or adopting *406 its own charter under this or any previous Constitution,” etc. The framers of the 1945 Constitution found no difficulty in recognizing the fact of the existence of cities having special charters under previous Constitutions, and it does seem strange that they would not have used similarly plain and direct language in making provision for the amendment of such charters. In considering what are “foregoing provisions,” it is to be borne in mind that under § 1 of the Schedule, the provisions of § 16, Art. IX of the 1875 Constitution were superseded by the 1945 Constitution.
I prefer to put my concurrence upon a construction of § 20, Art. VI, which would limit the submission of amendments by a commission as provided for a complete charter to those instances where the charter had been “adopted under the foregoing provisions,” that is, charters adopted subsequently to the 1945 Constitution. The next sentence provides that “Amendments may also be proposed by the legislative body of the city, ’ ’ etc. It will be noted the language here used is not “the legislative body of such city.”
I would not limit this reference to “the legislative body of the city” to those adopting special charters subsequent to the 1945 Constitution, as in the case provided in the first sentence of this section. I think it means that amendments may be proposed by the legislative body of any city having a special charter, whether the same was adopted under a previous Constitution or in conformity with the 1945 Constitútion. This brings my views into harmony with the holding -of the principal opinion that the 1945 Constitution did not intend to withdraw from municipalities the right to amend their charters which had been adopted before the effective date of the 1945 Constitution, and that the language of § 20, Art. VI (under the construction I have given it) makes this plain.
“Amendments of any city charter adopted under the foregoing provisions may be submitted to the electors by a commission as provided for a complete charter.”