noting that “when a defendant seeks to introduce exculpatory evidence based on an alternative perpetrator theory, the court must still evaluate this evidence under the ordinary evidentiary rules as it would any other exculpatory evidence”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “when a defendant seeks to introduce exculpatory evidence based on an alternative perpetrator theory, the court must still evaluate this evidence under the ordinary evidentiary rules as it would any other exculpatory evidence”
- stating that a collection of information can provide probable cause, even if each individual fact does not
- rejecting a similarly broad definition of the term “victims,” noting that such a broad definition would lead to “absurd” results
- concerning whether the sister of a murder victim was entitled to restitution
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PAGE, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Except to the extent that I agree with Justice Hanson that we should not decide the specific challenges to the DNA evidence, leaving them for another day when we are presented with a better record, I concur in the result reached by the court in parts I and III through VI of the opinion. I respectfully dissent with respect to part VII. The court’s reading of Minn.Stat. § 611A.01(b) is too narrow. “Restitution is primarily intended to compensate a crime victim for his or her loss by restoring the victim to his or her original financial condition.” State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Minn.1996). In other words, the restitution statute is a remedial statute. “It is elementary that remedial statutes must be liberally construed for the purpose of accomplishing their objects.” State v. Indus. Tool & Die Works, 220 Minn. 591, 604 , 21 N.W.2d 31, 38 (1945). Section 611A.01(b) provides that: “If the victim is a natural person and is deceased, ‘victim’ means the deceased’s surviving spouse or next of kin.” The court reads the terms “surviving spouse” and “next of kin” as mutually exclusive. 1 Reading the statute in this manner, however, contradicts our canons of statutory construction, ignores reality, and produces absurd results.
The construction of section 611A.01(b) that is most consistent with the object of compensating crime victims for their losses resulting from the crime is to read the word “or” between the terms “surviving spouse” and “next of kin” inclusively. This interpretation would allow the surviving spouse or any next of kin who has suffered any out-of-pocket loss as a result of the crime to receive restitution. It makes sense to read the statute in this manner because the deceased’s spouse is not the only one who may suffer an out-of-pocket loss as a result of the crime. Any one or combination of the following persons may suffer such a loss: spouse, parent, child, or sibling. For example, if the deceased’s spouse does not have the wherewithal to pay the deceased’s final medical or funeral expenses, some of those expenses may be borne by the deceased’s parents, siblings, or children. Although this example is hypothetical, the reality is that such an occurrence would not be at all unusual for the impoverished crime victim. Yet under the court’s reading of the restitution statute, only the spouse would be entitled to restitution and only for that portion of the expenses he or she paid. Thus, if those expenses totaled $2,500 and the spouse contributed $500 and the deceased’s parents, siblings, and children paid the remainder, the spouse would be entitled to restitution for his or her $500 and the remainder could not be recovered. This is an absurd result, 2 which I do not believe the legislature intended. It is even more absurd when the fact that the perpetrator of the crime is relieved of the obligation to provide full restitution is considered. *29 Clearly, .the .court’s reading of Minn.Stat. § 611A.01(b) undermines the statute’s remedial nature and frustrates its purpose.
I also believe that the court’s narrow definition of “next of kin” undermines the purpose of the restitution statute.. Under the court’s interpretation, if the deceased left a surviving spouse, children, and siblings, and the siblings paid for the deceased’s funeral, the siblings would not be the deceased’s nearest blood relatives and therefore would not be entitled to restitution even if the spouse did not seek restitution. Again, this strikes me as aij absurd result made even mo^e absurd by the fact that the person who caused the deceased’s death would be freed from any obligation to pay restitution. Thus, I would apply the definition of “next of kin” utilized in wrongful death actions and allow “blo'od relatives who are members of the class from which beneficiaries are chosen under the intestacy statute” to seek restitution. Wynkoop v. Carpenter, 574 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn.1998). In that one of the purposes of allowing crime victims to^receive restitution is to free the victim “from the burden of instituting a civil action based upon the same conduct,” Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d at 283 , it only seems logical to apply the definition of “next of kin” used in wrongful death actions.
Accordingly, I would hold that Linda Jensen’s sister, Sandra Halverson, is a member of the class of persons who are entitled to restitution under the statute. 3
. One need not have an overactive imagination to think of other examples that would produce equally absurd results.
. It is unclear from the record whether the expenses for which Halverson seeks restitution are the type that are recoverable under the restitution statute. Therefore, I question whether the court should consider the issue of whether Halverson is a member of the class of individuals who may seek restitution. That issue is not central to the resolution of this case and the issue would be moot on retrial if Jones is acquitted or the trial court determines that Halverson’s expenses are not of the type for which restitution may be sought.