determining that the phrase "personal injury" in the workers' compensation statute refers to harm to a body's physical structure
How later courts described this case
- determining that the phrase "personal injury" in the workers' compensation statute refers to harm to a body's physical structure
- explaining curable and incurable in terms of whether the argument's harmful, prejudicial effect can be removed by an instruction to disregard
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
The appellant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company contends on motion for rehearing that reversible error was present when the appellee Thurmond injected into the case the fact that the Industrial Accident Board had made a ruling concerning Thurmond. The appellant contends that the inference is clear, although erroneous, that the Industrial Accident Board had given Thurmond all that he was asking for. The appellant insurance company argues that if reversible error is not presented by the final arguments of plaintiff’s counsel in this case, there is no way a workmen’s compensation carrier can receive a fair and impartial trial and its right to object is, therefore, defeated. Citing Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Bickham, 138 Tex. 128 , 157 S.W.2d 356 (1942); Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Brown, 226 S.W.2d 233 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1949, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Looney v. Traders General Insurance Company, 231 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1950, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Tanner v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, 438 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Associated Employers Lloyds v. Landin, 205 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.Civ.App. —Eastland 1947, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
We have again reviewed the evidence adduced during the trial and reread the arguments made before the jury. When the matter first came out, it was brought out by the insurance company’s own witness. The appellant did not object to the answer as not being responsive nor did the appellant ask the court to have such answer stricken from the record and the jury properly instructed. The arguments made by plaintiff’s attorney are not to be condoned. We do not wish to be understood as approving the conduct of counsel in placing or attempting to place before the jury either directly or indirectly the facts that an award had been favorable to the claimant. However, upon such jury argument appellant’s attorney again refused to object and did not make any of the customary safeguards to reduce the alleged prejudicial effect upon the jury.
We have reread all of the cases cited by the appellant, all but one did not present reversible error. The conditions in all of the cases were more prejudicial, in our opinion, than that which is before this Court in *195 this case. Particular attention is made to the Supreme Court cases of Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Bickham, supra and Tanner v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, supra, where the Supreme Court held that there was no' reversible error.
We have again considered all of appellant’s points in its motion for rehearing and they are overruled.
OPINION ON FILING OF REMITTITUR
This Court suggested that appellee Wilburn Phil Thurmond remit the amount of one hundred ninety-nine dollars and fifteen cents ($199.15) as set forth in our original opinion. The appellee, through his attorneys, has filed a remittitur in the amount suggested and authorized in the opinion of this Court.
Therefore, in accordance with the opinion and the judgment of this Court heretofore rendered, the judgment of the trial court is here reformed to the extent of the amount remitted by appellee Thurmond.
The judgment as herein reformed is now affirmed.