holding that the statute of frauds did not bar Sheerin’s claim to an interest in the real property held solely in Davis’s name because Sheerin was “not relying on an oral conveyance of land, but [was] contending that the six tracts were all purchased by and for the benefit of the partnership”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the statute of frauds did not bar Sheerin’s claim to an interest in the real property held solely in Davis’s name because Sheerin was “not relying on an oral conveyance of land, but [was] contending that the six tracts were all purchased by and for the benefit of the partnership”
- holding that court, under its *20 general equity power, may order an equitable buyout of a minority shareholder’s shares for oppressive acts by the majority in an appropriate case where less harsh remedies are inadequate to protect the rights of the parties
- holding charge objection of “no evidence, insufficient evidence, no predicate, comment on the evidence” did not preserve appellant’s comment-on-the-weight-of-the-evidence complaint because appellant failed to explain how question constituted comment on the evidence and only included this among other stock objections
- holding that court, under its general equity power, may order an equitable buyout of a minority shareholder’s shares for oppressive acts by the majority in an appropriate case where less harsh remedies are inadequate to protect the rights of the parties
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Lee C. Ritchie v. Ann Caldwell Rupe, as Trustee for the Dallas Gordon Rupe, III 1995 Family Trust, 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 771 (2014)
754 S.W.2d 375, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied), disapproved of on other grounds by Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 876
The opinion
EVANS, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority’s holding except to the extent the majority concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring that the appellants pay reasonable dividends annually to appellee in future years from retained profits and retained earnings of the corporation, as long as the appellee remains a shareholder in the corporation.
In my opinion, the jury’s findings support the trial court’s conclusion that unless ordered to do so, appellants would never pay any dividends to the appellee in the future. Therefore, it is my view that the court did not abuse its discretion in directing that the appellants pay reasonable dividends to the appellee pending the effectua *389 tion of the ordered buy-out. Although, as the majority points out, the appellee did have the protection of other injunctive orders and the receivership, that protection does not, in my opinion, preclude the trial court’s determination that a specific injunc-tive order was needed to provide adequate protection.