stating that personal opinion testimony of a witness who knows the person is one method of proving character
How later courts described this case
- stating that personal opinion testimony of a witness who knows the person is one method of proving character
- Legislative use of terms reputation and character, joined by conjunction and evidences intent to abrogate old rule that reputation was the only approved method of proving character
- “As to the remaining five witnesses, who were not included in the bill of exception, we do not know what their excluded testimony would have been or even if they 16 were prevented from testifying to anything, and we will not speculate as to such.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*844 CLINTON, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the Judge White’s plurality-opinion inasmuch as it concludes that by “character” evidence, Article 37.07, § 3(a), V.A.C.C.P., the Legislature authorized use of opinion testimony as to character. I am frankly puzzled, however, that in holding evidence of specific conduct inadmissible, in accordance with the plurality opinion handed down this day in Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), he chooses to characterize that opinion as having “overruled a substantial amount of caselaw....” at 839. Though a handful of cases were “disapproved” in Murphy , by and large our opinion on rehearing was an attempt to harmonize prior caselaw insofar as possible.
Having concluded error was committed in this cause, the plurality opinion proceeds to find it harmless, relying primarily on the Court’s opinion on rehearing in Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). The Court would do better, in my opinion, to await disposition of certain petitions recently granted to review various courts of appeals’ application of Tex.R.App.Pro., Rule 81(b)(2) analysis to Rose error, before undertaking to rely on Rose here. At any rate, this Court should not endeavor to conduct a harm analysis in the first instance, but should remand to the court of appeals “for it to exercise the unique power and authority retained by that court under Article V, §§ 5 and 6 and other provision cited” at Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, at 783-85 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (Clinton, J., dissenting). See also Hammett v. State, 713 S.W.2d 102, at 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
Agreeing with the plurality in its resolution of the substantive question of law we granted this petition to decide, I nevertheless dissent to its conclusion the error was harmless in this cause.