stating that an officer has probable cause to arrest when “at that moment the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which (he) had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrested person had committed or was committing an offense”
How later courts described this case
- stating that an officer has probable cause to arrest when “at that moment the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which (he) had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrested person had committed or was committing an offense”
- holding that art. 14.01 arrests have previously been sanctioned when an individual's conduct, while not overtly criminal by itself, is coupled with an officer's prior knowledge so that the otherwise innocuous conduct reflects that an offense is then occurring
- “The test for determining the existence of probable cause for a warrantless arrest 13 has been stated as follows: Whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which (he) had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrested person had committed or was committing an offense.”
- remanding case to court of appeals restores jurisdiction to that court
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Once again a majority demonstrates it is bound and determined to keep the law to its liking. See, e.g., Beets v. State, (Tex.Cr.App. No. 69,583, delivered September 21, 1988). I dissent.
Considering this cause in one context the Court professes to protect against “another excision of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches,” Adkins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 363, at 366 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
But when it comes to one of our own statutes restricting authority of a peace officer to make a warrantless arrest — and thus a search incident thereto — “when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view,” Article 14.01, V.A.C.C.P., for the clear statutory requisite that an offense actually be “COMMITTED,” the majority substitutes “PROBABLE CAUSE” to believe an offense is being or has been committed, thereby itself making yet “another excision” of protection against warrantless arrests and incidental searches.
To still another judicial assault on plainly expressed will of the Legislature, I dissent.
CAMPBELL and DUNCAN, JJ., join in this opinion.