stating that a new trial will not be granted upon the ground of newly discovered evidence where the -16- evidence has no other effect “than to discredit the testimony of a witness at the original trial, contradict a witness’s statements, or impeach a witness, unless the testimony of the witness who is sought to be impeached was so important to the issue, and the evidence impeaching the witness so strong and convincing, that a different result must necessarily follow”
How later courts described this case
- stating that a new trial will not be granted upon the ground of newly discovered evidence where the -16- evidence has no other effect “than to discredit the testimony of a witness at the original trial, contradict a witness’s statements, or impeach a witness, unless the testimony of the witness who is sought to be impeached was so important to the issue, and the evidence impeaching the witness so strong and convincing, that a different result must necessarily follow”
- stating that a new trial will not be granted upon the ground of newly discovered evidence where the evidence has no other effect “than to discredit the testimony of a witness at the original trial, contradict a witness’s statements, or impeach a witness, unless the testimony of the witness who is sought to be impeached was so important to the issue, and the evidence impeaching the witness so strong and convincing, that a different result must necessarily follow”
- reiterating that “a new trial will not be granted upon the ground of newly discovered evidence where it appears that such new evidence can have no other effect than to discredit the testimony of a witness at the original trial, contradict a witness’s statements, or impeach a witness, unless the testimony of the witness who is sought to be impeached was so important to the issue, and the evidence impeaching the witness so strong and convincing, that a different result must necessarily follow”
- stating “supposing all the evidence new and old to be before another jury, whether they ought to return a verdict more favorable . . . than the one returned on the original trial”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GALBREATH, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached in Judge O'Brien’s exhaustive opinion, although I agree with appellant, Emmit Evans, that he was denied the right to confront his co-defendant Marion Smith, concerning statements by Smith implicating Evans, as recounted by the witness Valerio. That these statements were made as part of an alleged conversation between the two defendants should not, it seems to me, take them out of the Bruton rule. Whatever Evans said, of course, would be admissible. What Smith said should not, as I see it.
However, I would hold the error harmless in view of the other independent and competent evidence of Evans’ participation in the murder. I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the complained of testimony did not effect the verdict. Harrington v. State, 215 Tenn. 338 , 385 S.W.2d 758 (1964); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969).