holding that a “yes” answer on both a question of assault and a question of self-defense did not conflict
How later courts described this case
- holding that a “yes” answer on both a question of assault and a question of self-defense did not conflict
- noting that definition of unlawful recognizes defense of justification
- describing self-defense, a defense long recognized as a plea in confession and avoidance
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WARD, Justice,
dissenting.
I now respectfully dissent. No amount of rationalization or worthy suggestion of what the trial Court should have done can void the conflict as exists in the present verdict. The jury first determined that the Defendant, Brown, committed an assault and battery upon the Plaintiff and an assault and battery was defined as the use of any unlawful violence to the person of another. The jury next determined that Brown was acting in self-defense and self-defense was defined in the usual manner of excuse or justification for what would otherwise be unlawful violence. The majority opinion is in conflict with Pon Lip Chew v. Gilliland, supra, and until the Supreme Court determines the issue to the contrary, it should be followed. The cause should be reversed and remanded.