concluding that K.R.S. § 342 sets forth “an important public interest that injured employees shall receive, and employers shall be obligated to pay, for medical expenses, rehabilitative services and a portion of lost wages,” and any “action on the part of an employer which prevents an employee from asserting his statutory right to medical treatment and compensation violates that policy”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that K.R.S. § 342 sets forth “an important public interest that injured employees shall receive, and employers shall be obligated to pay, for medical expenses, rehabilitative services and a portion of lost wages,” and any “action on the part of an employer which prevents an employee from asserting his statutory right to medical treatment and compensation violates that policy”
- recognizing a cause of action for discharge in retaliation for filing workers’ compensation claims even though, at the time, the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act did not contain a retaliation provision
- describing one question presented, ultimately answered affirmatively, as whether “the Workers’ Compensation Act” provided grounds for recognizing an exception to the “terminable at-will” doctrine
- the cause of action for wrongful discharge “is but another facet of compensation for outrageous conduct as described in Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 46 (1965), interference with prospective advantage as described in Prosser, Law of Torts, Sec. 130 (4th Ed. 1971), and invasion of privacy as described in Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 652A & B (1965).”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STEPHENSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion piously states that we do not abandon the “terminable at will” doctrine, yet a careful reading of the opinion reveals that the doctrine is abandoned. I imagine an ingenious lawyer can nearly always find a right “implicit in a statute,” particularly when such a right can mean most anything as demonstrated by the majority.
Somehow this opinion rests on the foundation that Firestone violated a statute. This foundation is necessary for the reliance on KRS 446.070, a person injured by the violation of any statute etc. The statement that the Workers’ Compensation Act was violated is pure sophistry. I am baffled as to how a comparison can be made between the collective bargaining statute and the situation here. Discharge for union activity is certainly “coercion” within the meaning of the statute and constitutes a violation of the statute. In Pari-Mutuel Clerks Union we did not recognize an action for wrongful discharge based on public policy implicit in an act of legislature as stated in the majority opinion. “Public policy” is not mentioned in the Pari-Mutuel case. In that case there was simply a holding of “coercion” in discharging the employee, thus constituting a violation of the statute and authorizing an action under KRS 446.070 to recover damages. There is absolutely nothing in Pari-Mutuel which can be used as authority for the majority opinion. Public policy should be left to the legislature.
The majority opinion is not based on reason, it is simply an expression of distaste for discharge of an employee for filing a claim for workers’ compensation, “outrageous conduct” says the opinion. It will be interesting to see how this concept develops. An open invitation is extended to every discharged employee to file suit and see if the majority of this court agrees the discharge was for acceptable reasons. Violation of a right “implicit” in a statute is so vague as to cover about any situation the majority determines in its wisdom is contrary to the standards of justice.
The standard of implicit violation of a statutory right is little better than the Court of Appeals’ opinion rationalizing an implied contract. Neither standard is logical or reasonable by any test.