concluding that K.R.S. § 342 sets forth “an important public interest that injured employees shall receive, and employers shall be obligated to pay, for medical expenses, rehabilitative services and a portion of lost wages,” and any “action on the part of an employer which prevents an employee from asserting his statutory right to medical treatment and compensation violates that policy”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that K.R.S. § 342 sets forth “an important public interest that injured employees shall receive, and employers shall be obligated to pay, for medical expenses, rehabilitative services and a portion of lost wages,” and any “action on the part of an employer which prevents an employee from asserting his statutory right to medical treatment and compensation violates that policy”
- recognizing a cause of action for discharge in retaliation for filing workers’ compensation claims even though, at the time, the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act did not contain a retaliation provision
- describing one question presented, ultimately answered affirmatively, as whether “the Workers’ Compensation Act” provided grounds for recognizing an exception to the “terminable at-will” doctrine
- the cause of action for wrongful discharge “is but another facet of compensation for outrageous conduct as described in Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 46 (1965), interference with prospective advantage as described in Prosser, Law of Torts, Sec. 130 (4th Ed. 1971), and invasion of privacy as described in Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 652A & B (1965).”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
VANCE, J.,
agrees with the legal principles as stated herein but would hold that the instructions of the trial court on the subject were erroneous because they did not require a jury finding that the sole reason for the firing was the fact that a compensation claim was filed.
STEPHENSON, J., dissents and files herewith a dissenting opinion in which WINTERSHEIMER, J., joins.