finding that “violent acts indicating the relationship -8- between the victim of a violent crime and the defendant prior to the commission of the offense are relevant to show [the] defendant’s hostility toward the victim, malice, intent, and a settled purpose to harm the victim”
How later courts described this case
- finding that “violent acts indicating the relationship -8- between the victim of a violent crime and the defendant prior to the commission of the offense are relevant to show [the] defendant’s hostility toward the victim, malice, intent, and a settled purpose to harm the victim”
- holding that “[v]iolent acts indicating the relationship between the - 17 - victim of a violent crime and the defendant prior to the commission of the offense are relevant to show defendant’s hostility toward the victim, malice, intent, and a settled purpose to harm the victim”
- ruling that the victim’s hearsay statements expressing fear of the defendant were admissible under the state of mind exception and relevant “to reveal the falsehood” of the defendant’s statement to the police indicating that he and his wife, the victim, were reconciling
- finding that the affidavit established probable cause to search the defendant’s residence where the objects sought were of a type kept at one’s residence and the defendant admitted to returning directly home after being with the victims on the night of the murder
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DAUGHTREY, Justice,
concurring.
I concur fully in the decision to affirm the defendant’s conviction on three counts of first-degree, premeditated murder. The guilt-innocence phase of the trial was meticulously handled by the trial judge, and although no trial is perfect, the mistakes made in this one were apparently trivial and without discernible affect on the jury’s verdict.
The sentencing phase of the trial was also carefully conducted, and, given the senseless nature and the horrifying circumstances of the murders committed in this ease, it is not surprising that a “death-qualified” jury would vote to impose the ultimate penalty against Oscar Franklin Smith on all three counts. As to one of the victims, Jason Burnett, who was deliberately eviscerated by his step-father and left to die an unnecessarily painful and terrifying death, there can be little doubt that capital punishment is both proportional to the offense and supported by sufficient aggravating circumstances, as set out in Tennessee’s first-degree murder statute. Because the two additional death penalties are obviously redundant, and because the strength of the evidence with regard to those two sentences is less clear than it is with regard to the murder of Jason, I conclude that it is unnecessary to subject them to further examination.
In the absence of trial error, the only other impediment to imposition of the death penalty for the murder of Jason Burnett would be a finding that the procedure set out in Tennessee’s capital punishment statute was unconstitutional in some respect (including the manner of execution). However, as the author of the lead opinion in this case points out, all the constitutional questions raised by this defendant have been previously decided against his insistence, although sometimes by a divided court.
For the reasons set out in this separate opinion, I concur in the judgment of the trial court finding the defendant guilty of murder in counts one, two, and four of the indictment and in the sentence imposed with regard to count four.