holding that a psychologist who mistakenly concluded that a child had been molested by her father did not owe a duty to the third party father, who had been criminally charged as a result, in part because of the absence of a physician-patient relationship, even though it was foreseeable
How later courts described this case
- holding that a psychologist who mistakenly concluded that a child had been molested by her father did not owe a duty to the third party father, who had been criminally charged as a result, in part because of the absence of a physician-patient relationship, even though it was foreseeable
- recognizing the foreseeable harm to a parent who was accused of sexual abuse due to allegedly negligent mental health treatment provided to the child, though ultimately concluding that the mental health professional still did not owe a duty of care to the parent
- holding that a mental health professional had no physician-patient relationship with her patient’s father and-therefore owed no duty to the father not to negligently misdiagnose the condition of the child
- acknowledging harm to a parent accused of sexual abuse is foreseeable but holding foreseeability is not alone a sufficient basis for creating a new duty; court ultimately held mental health care practitioner owes no duty to parent not to negligently misdiagnose condition of child and thus psychologist could not be held liable to father for misdiagnosis that father had abused his child
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by ALTHAUS BY ALTHAUS v. Cohen, 1998 Pa. Super. LEXIS 631 (1998)
In reaching this conclusion, we reject the approach taken by the Texas Supreme Court in Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.1994).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Chambers v. Hermann Hospital Estate, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 1654 (1996)
the parties have cited us — apart from Otis Engineering and Bird — are readily distinguishable.
The opinion
CORNYN, Justice,
joined by
SPECTOR, J.,
concurs with the judgment.
I join the Court’s judgment solely for the reason that I agree that Bird’s statement, made during the course of judicial proceedings, was privileged.