holding that a psychologist who mistakenly concluded that a child had been molested by her father did not owe a duty to the third party father, who had been criminally charged as a result, in part because of the absence of a physician-patient relationship, even though it was foreseeable
How later courts described this case
- holding that a psychologist who mistakenly concluded that a child had been molested by her father did not owe a duty to the third party father, who had been criminally charged as a result, in part because of the absence of a physician-patient relationship, even though it was foreseeable
- recognizing the foreseeable harm to a parent who was accused of sexual abuse due to allegedly negligent mental health treatment provided to the child, though ultimately concluding that the mental health professional still did not owe a duty of care to the parent
- holding that a mental health professional had no physician-patient relationship with her patient’s father and-therefore owed no duty to the father not to negligently misdiagnose the condition of the child
- acknowledging harm to a parent accused of sexual abuse is foreseeable but holding foreseeability is not alone a sufficient basis for creating a new duty; court ultimately held mental health care practitioner owes no duty to parent not to negligently misdiagnose condition of child and thus psychologist could not be held liable to father for misdiagnosis that father had abused his child
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by ALTHAUS BY ALTHAUS v. Cohen, 1998 Pa. Super. LEXIS 631 (1998)
In reaching this conclusion, we reject the approach taken by the Texas Supreme Court in Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.1994).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Chambers v. Hermann Hospital Estate, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 1654 (1996)
the parties have cited us — apart from Otis Engineering and Bird — are readily distinguishable.
The opinion
GAMMAGE, Justice,
joined by
DOGGETT, J.,
concurring.
Though I concur, today’s judgment should not be read as conferring a grant of absolute immunity upon mental health professionals. The opinion concludes that “a privilege exists for communication of an alleged child abuser’s identity in the course of a judicial proceeding whether [or not] the accusation was negligently made.'” Every privilege carries with it a responsibility. If we are to grant mental health professionals the privilege of making such accusations, even if they are not called upon to make them, we also should hold them to an appropriate standard of professional responsibility. Adhering to its duty to recognize changes in the common law, Texas courts have from time to time imposed standards on various occupations. See, e.g., El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Tex.1987); Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d at 311; Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d at 369.
False accusations of child abuse can be devastating: they destroy reputations, relationships, even lives. Our society faces no problem more serious than child abuse. Though we should give mental health workers in this field some latitude and protection *773 in their efforts to eradicate child abuse, commensurate standards of professional discretion should apply, and failure to adhere to such standards could foreseeably result in their judicial recognition and enforcement.