The opinion
DAVIDSON, Judge,
concurring.
In the case of Cooper v. State, 162 Tex. Cr. R. 624, 288 . S.W. 2d 762 (state’s motion for rehearing overruled April 4, 1956), my brethren held that where'a peace officer is guilty of entrapping another into committing a crime no offense has been committed and that neither the officer nor the other person may be punished therefor. To that holding, I entered my solemn protest.
Now, within less than two months after that opinion was delivered, my brethren are here holding the exact contrary of their holding in the Cooper case.
*311 Here, the appellant was not the prostitute. Her only connection with the transaction was to introduce the officer to the prostitute who consented to engage in an act of sexual intercourse with the officer. It was the prostitute whom the officer was dealing with — not the appellant.
Clearly, under the holding in the Cooper case, neither the officer nor the prostitute had committed any offense, for the officer had entrapped her into that offense, notwithstanding which this appellant is convicted of bringing the officer and the prostitute together.
So, we have a very peculiar situation wherein the principals are guilty of no crime, yet the person who is guilty of bringing them together — and to that extent is acting with them — is guilty of violating the law.
If the Cooper case is good law, why not follow it? If it is not to be followed, overrule it.
The affirmance of this case is in accord with my dissenting opinion in the Cooper case, and I therefore concur in the judgment of affirmance.