“[T]he Nebraska Supreme Court has adopted in substance section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he Nebraska Supreme Court has adopted in substance section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”
- “[T]he Nebraska Supreme Court has adopted in substance section 402A of the Restatement (Second
- requiring a strict liability plaintiff to show he was "rightfully using that product”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Smith, J'.,
dissenting.
The circumstantial evidence rule stated in the second syllabus of Norcross v. Gingery, 181 Neb. 783 , 150 N. W. 2d 919 (1967), is either misleading or incorrect. See Wolstenholm v. Kaliff, 176 Neb. 358, 366 , 126 N. W. 2d 178, 183 (1964), (White, C. J., concurring).
Taylor’s testimony to causation touched an ultimate iaet, but there I see no reason for an exclusionary ruling. The testimony, however, was conjectural. Furthermore, assuming arguendo the existence of a factual issue of causation, I think the testimony was superflu *446 ous. “ ‘. . . whenever the point is reached at which the tribunal is being told that which it is itself entirely equipped to determine without the witness’ aid . . ., his testimony is superfluous . . ..’ ” Sears v. Mid-City Motors, Inc., 179 Neb. 100 , 136 N. W. 2d 428 (1965).
I otherwise concur with the dissenting opinion by Boslaugh, J.