concluding that collateral attack on Railroad Commission order was impermissible because adminis- trative statutes provided sole method of attack
How later courts described this case
- concluding that collateral attack on Railroad Commission order was impermissible because adminis- trative statutes provided sole method of attack
- holding that “an action for 11 declaratory judgment does not lie” in suit that asserts “a direct attack upon the [agency’s] order by appeal”
- concluding that collateral attack on a Commission order was impermissible because administrative statutes provided sole method of attack
- holding “an action for declaratory judgment does not lie” in a suit that asserts a “direct attack upon the [agency’s] order by appeal”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Calvert
joined by Justice Walker, dissenting.
The manner in which the Commission, the trial court, the Court of Civil Appeals and the majority of this court have dealt with the subject matter of this suit appeals to one as likely the best practical solution of a knotty problem, but it hardly squares, even loosely, with statutory requirements or established legal precedents.
*253 In a single hearing amendment has been ordered of 150 certificates held by 129 specialized carriers authorizing transportation of 130 commodities. One hundred six of the certificates are state-wide in scope and the remainder are confined to more or less local areas.
I do not quarrel with the procedure of dealing with the matter in a single or joint hearing. On the other hand, the amendment of each certificate represents the granting of a certificate right which, under the applicable statute, can only be based on need for the service. Each amendment therefore represénts a separate new service and should be supported by proof. In my judgment the record simply does not justify a conclusion that there is substantial evidence reasonably supporting the wholesale granting of all of the amended certificates. There may be substantial evidence reasonably supporting the granting of some of them. It would serve no useful purpose to analyze the evidence at length.
Opinion delivered January 15, 1958.
Rehearing overruled March 5, 1958.