some evidence of bad faith when evidence would enable "jury [to] conclude that [insurer] began with its intended outcome and investigated backwards"
How later courts described this case
- some evidence of bad faith when evidence would enable "jury [to] conclude that [insurer] began with its intended outcome and investigated backwards"
- whether insurer had reasonable basis to deny claim is not determined solely by what insurer knew but by what it could have known through a reasonably thorough investigation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OPINION ON REHEARING
In our original opinion, we cited Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8308-10.42 (Vernon Supp.1993), to show that the Legislature did not intend to apply the cap on punitive damages set forth in chapter 41 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code to bad faith cases. Although not raised in its brief, on motion for rehearing, Nationwide *654 contends that article 8308-10.42 should apply to the instant case. Article 8308-10.42 is part of the revamped Texas Worker’s Compensation Act (the Act) enacted by the Legislature on January 1, 1991. Act of January 1, 1991, 71st Leg., 2nd C.S., Ch. 1, § 17.18, 1989 Tex.Spec.Laws 1, 122. The change in law made by the Act “applies only to an injury for which the date of injury is on or after the effective date of [the] Act.” Id. § 17.18(c). Article 8308-10.42 became effective on June 1,1991. Id. § 17.19. Although the trial of this cause was in June 1992, the dates of Mr. Crowe’s injury and denial of Mrs. Crowe’s claim occurred before the effective date of article 8308-10.42 and therefore, that section is inapplicable.
Nationwide also contends that the Crowes did not have standing to pursue this bad faith case because they were not parties to the “special relationship” created by the contract between employee, employer, and insurance carrier described in Aranda. Nationwide points out that its complaint was preserved in its Motion For New Trial, Remittitur or For Reformation of the Judgment. We express doubts about the propriety of raising a lack of standing complaint for the first time on a Motion for New Trial. However, even if error was preserved, we find that Nationwide’s argument is without merit. In support of its argument, Nationwide cites Transportation Ins. Co. v. Archer, 832 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1992, writ denied). In Archer , an injured employee and his spouse sued the insurance carrier for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the handling of the employee’s worker’s compensation claim. 832 S.W.2d at 404 . The court held that the spouse had no independent cause of action against the carrier for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in connection with the carrier’s handling of her husband’s claim. 832 S.W.2d at 405-6 .
We agree with the Crowes that Archer is distinguishable because it involved an employee who was alive and capable of pursuing his own claim. One must have a legal right which has been breached to have standing to seek redress for an injury. Develop-Cepts, Inc. v. City of Galveston, 668 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). Here, the Crowes are recognized beneficiaries who have a right to claim benefits under worker’s compensation law. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8306 § 8(a) (repealed 1991). In attempting to exercise that right, the Crowes alleged that Nationwide did not treat them fairly and acted in bad faith. Hence, we find that the Crowes had standing to bring this action. Accordingly, we overrule Nationwide’s motion for rehearing.