explaining that this issue had been addressed previously and the death penalty statute “ ‘does not in any way constitutionally deprive the sentencer of the discretion mandated by the individualized sentence requirements of the constitution’ ”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that this issue had been addressed previously and the death penalty statute “ ‘does not in any way constitutionally deprive the sentencer of the discretion mandated by the individualized sentence requirements of the constitution’ ”
- holding that the statute does sufficiently limit exercise of the jury's discretion once matters in aggravation are found, and that the statute is not unconstitutional because it allows the admission of hearsay evidence at sentencing
- holding that by not contesting the trial cou rt's jury selection procedure until after the case was submitted to the jury, rather than contemp oraneous ly objecting, the accu sed waived th at issue on ap peal
- holding that Tennessee's death penalty statutes "do[ ] not in any way constitutionally deprive the sentencer of the discretion mandated by the individualized sentence requirements of the constitution"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
REID, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the reversal of the sentence; however, I would affirm the conviction and reduce the sentence to life imprisonment. For the reasons stated in State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn.1992), I would hold that Article I, Section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death penalty in this case. The record does not show that the killing was deliberate or intentional or accompanied by a conscious purpose of producing death or a conscious realization that death will likely occur. Supra at 353 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting).