The opinion
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO TRANSFER TO BANC
PER CURIAM.
Appellant’s “Motion for Rehearing or in the Alternative to Transfer to Banc” is to the effect that our opinion “adopts the former strict construction” of Art. X, § 6, Mo. Const., and § 137.100(5), quoted therein, and overlooks that said former construction was later held so strict as to be unreasonable. Salvation Army v. Hoehn, 354 Mo. 107 , 188 S.W.2d 826, 829 [4-7], overruling, in so far as conflicting, State ex rel. St. *779 Louis Y.M.C.A. v. Gehner, 320 Mo. 1172 , 11 S.W.2d 30 , and St. Louis Y.M.C.A. v. Gehner, 329 Mo. 1007 , 47 S.W.2d 776 , 81 A.L.R. 1449 . See also Bader Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 358 Mo. 747 , 217 S.W.2d 489, 492 ; Y.M.C.A. v. Sestric, 362 Mo. 551 , 242 S.W.2d 497, 503 .
Appellant, in its original brief and in this motion, quotes the following from Baptist Hospital v. City of Nashville, 156 Tenn. 589 , 3 S.W.2d 1059, 1060 [1]: “The courts are practically unanimous in holding that a charitable institution does not lose its charitable character, and its consequent exemption from taxation, merely because recipients of its benefits, who are able to pay, are required to do so, where funds derived in this manner are devoted to the charitable purposes of the institution.” See also State ex rel. Alexian Brothers’ Hospital v. Powers, 10 Mo.App. 263 , affirmed by a divided court in 74 Mo. 476 and 62 A.L.R. 330 .
Our holdings are that charitable use exemptions depend upon the actual use made of the. property and the stated objectives of the corporate organization are not controlling. St. Louis Gospel Center v. Prose, Mo., 280 S.W.2d 827, 830 [4] and cases cited; Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. Hoehn, 355 Mo. 257 , 196 S.W.2d 134, 143 .
Salvation Army v. Hoehn, supra, 188 S.W.2d 826, 830 , quotes State ex rel. Spillers v. Johnston, 214 Mo.’ 656, 113 S.W. 1083, 1085 (b), 21 L.R.A.,N.S., 171, on the meaning of “used exclusively” : “ ‘The phrase “exclusively used” has reference to the primary and inherent use as over against a mere secondary and incidental use. People ex rel. v. Lawlor, 74 App.Div. 553 , 77 N.Y.S. [840], loc. cit. 842 et seq. If the incidental use (in this instance [the proprietor and family] residing in the building) does not interrupt the exclusive occupation of the building for school purposes, but dovetails into or rounds out those purposes, then there could fairly be said to be left an exclusive use in the school on which the law lays hold.’” See Evangelical Lutheran Synod case, supra, 196 S.W.2d l. c. 143 [15].
St. Louis Council, Boy Scouts of America v. Burgess, 362 Mo. 146 , 240 S.W.2d 684, 686 [1, 2], citing authority, states: “Actual and regular user for such purposes [authorized exemption objectives] must be proved. Mere prospective user is not sufficient.” Property used for hospital purposes is not specifically named as exempt from taxation in Art. X, § 6, Mo.Const. or in § 137.100(5). Hospitals must come within the phrase “for purposes purely charitable” to qualify for tax exemption under said provisions.
Appellant would distinguish this case from Trustees of Local 88, etc. v. State Tax Commission, Mo., 367 S.W.2d 549 , on the ground that case involved “a dispensary — a building in which doctors maintained offices” ; contending “that the property of a nonprofit hospital devoted to alleviating the suffering of mankind is, by nature of its use, ‘used exclusively for purposes purely charitable,’ even though the hospital is available only to members of a non-profit association.” We do not agree that the property of every hospital, organized under the benevolent or nonprofit association’s law is necessarily, actually and regularly used exclusively for purposes purely charitable. As brought out in our statement of the facts, the facilities of appellant’s hospital are available only to members of appellant association. Many years have passed since there were any pay patients. The primary and apparently the sole use of the hospital is for the advantage of the members of plaintiff association. The reasoning underlying the result reached in the Trustees of Local 88 case is applicable to the stipulated material facts of this record.
Appellant’s motion is overruled.