holding that the fact that no harm was suffered as a result of the breach of duty “is immaterial,” because a self-dealing fiduciary faces “strict liability”; ordering “equitable restitution” of contributions to partnership
How later courts described this case
- holding that the fact that no harm was suffered as a result of the breach of duty “is immaterial,” because a self-dealing fiduciary faces “strict liability”; ordering “equitable restitution” of contributions to partnership
- “It is axiomatic that a managing partner in a general partnership, owes his co-partners the highest fiduciary duty recognized in the law_ In a limited partnership, the general partner acting in complete control stands in the same fiduciary capacity to the limited partners as a trustee stands to the beneficiaries of the trust” [citation omitted]
- “In a limited partnership, the general partner acting in complete control stands in the same fiduciary capacity to the limited partners as a trustee stands to the beneficiaries of the trust.”
- discussing "the presumption of the existence of fraud inaccessible to the eye of the court” in self-dealing cases
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by LSP Investment Partnership v. Bennett, 989 F.2d 779 (1993)
He argues that Crenshaw is distinguishable because,
Distinguished by LSP Investment Partnership v. Bennett, 970 F.2d 138 (1992)
He argues that Crenshaw is distinguishable because,
The opinion
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
SHANNON, Justice.
All parties have moved for rehearing. Appellants have brought to our attention failure of the judgment to award post judgment interest. Under Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 5069-1.05, appellants are entitled to nine percent interest on their judgment from the date of judgment. The date of judgment referred to in art. 5069-1.05 is the judgment of the trial court. Having found the trial court’s judgment to be erroneous in part, the judgment of this Court takes the place of the lower court judgment. Tex.R.Civ.P. 434. Appellants are, therefore, entitled to post-judgment interest at nine percent from the date of the trial court’s judgment, that being December 21, 1979.
Post-judgment interest is a creation of statute to which appellants are entitled whether or not specifically awarded in the judgment. Trinity Portland Cement v. Coastal Indus. Water Authority, 551 S.W.2d 76 (Tex.Civ.App.1977), rev'd on other grounds, 563 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.1978). To avoid the possibility of appellants having to file a declaratory judgment to collect this interest, this Court reforms the judgment to specifically allow post-judgment interest. Robert Brown is awarded the sum of $2,000 with nine percent interest from December 21, 1979. David Crenshaw is awarded the sum of $16,000 with nine percent interest from December 21, 1979.
*893 Points of error raised by both appellants and appellees have been carefully considered and are found to be without merit. Both motions for rehearing are overruled.
Reversed and Rendered in Part and in Part Affirmed on Motion for Rehearing.
POWERS, J., not sitting.