recognizing that “[t]he discretion of the District Court, in granting new trials, is almost the only protection to the citizen against the illegal or oppressive verdicts of prejudiced, careless, or ignorant juries, and we think the District Court should never hesitate to use that discretion whenever the ends of justice have not been attained by those verdicts”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “[t]he discretion of the District Court, in granting new trials, is almost the only protection to the citizen against the illegal or oppressive verdicts of prejudiced, careless, or ignorant juries, and we think the District Court should never hesitate to use that discretion whenever the ends of justice have not been attained by those verdicts”
- holding that both the granting and the denying of a motion for new trial rests within the discretion of the trial court, and appellate courts ordinarily will not reverse those decisions unless the trial court has abused its discretion
- holding that “the accused is required to allege sufficient grounds to apprise the trial judge and the State as to why he believes himself entitled to a new trial”
- adding that it is not reviewing court’s place to substitute its judgment for that of trial court but to determine whether its decision was unreasonable or arbitrary
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
On November 3, 1987, the people of Texas gave the State a right to appeal, pursuant to general law. Article 5, Section 26, Texas Constitution. The Legislature provided for such appeals on a limited basis. Article 44.01, V.A.C.C.P. Specifically, the State was afforded the right to appeal an order of the trial court granting a new trial. Article 44.01(a)(2), supra. These changes were made to afford redress in limited circumstances where a trial court escaped review in granting a new trial without basis in law or fact.
In Evans v. State, 843 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), we recognized that the grounds enunciated in Rule 30(b), Tex. R.App.Pro., were not exhaustive. We did not, however, intimate that the factual proof to support an alleged ground for new trial was in any way altered by the promulgation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. In the case at bar, as Judge Campbell ably demonstrates in his dissenting opinion, there is nothing in this record showing what evidence would have been presented to support the granting of a new trial. To such a drastic departure from settled precedent, I dissent.
Where a motion for new trial is made based on previously unpresented evidence, the law has always required a showing of what the unpresented testimony would have been. See, e.g., Willis v. State, 626 S.W.2d 500 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). If the motion for new trial asserts facts which are not in the record but would necessitate a *699 new trial, the burden is on the defendant to establish the truth of the averments. 25 Tex.Jur.3d — Criminal Law, Sections 3553-3568.
Today the majority effectively repeals the 1987 constitutional amendment and establishes a road map whereby trial courts may, without factual or legal basis, grant a new trial and avoid review.
To such action, I also dissent.