recognizing that “[t]he discretion of the District Court, in granting new trials, is almost the only protection to the citizen against the illegal or oppressive verdicts of prejudiced, careless, or ignorant juries, and we think the District Court should never hesitate to use that discretion whenever the ends of justice have not been attained by those verdicts”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “[t]he discretion of the District Court, in granting new trials, is almost the only protection to the citizen against the illegal or oppressive verdicts of prejudiced, careless, or ignorant juries, and we think the District Court should never hesitate to use that discretion whenever the ends of justice have not been attained by those verdicts”
- holding that both the granting and the denying of a motion for new trial rests within the discretion of the trial court, and appellate courts ordinarily will not reverse those decisions unless the trial court has abused its discretion
- holding that “the accused is required to allege sufficient grounds to apprise the trial judge and the State as to why he believes himself entitled to a new trial”
- adding that it is not reviewing court’s place to substitute its judgment for that of trial court but to determine whether its decision was unreasonable or arbitrary
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MALONEY, Judge,
concurs:
The Court of Appeals found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for new trial and also in its finding that not to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice. Believing that trial judges should have unbridled discretion to set aside pleas of guilty, I concur in the result reached in part III of the opinion. See State v. Gonzales, 820 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991) (“interests of justice standard” has long been applied in Texas civil cases and in federal cases); see also 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 551 (1982) (application of “interests of justice standard” in federal courts); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1428 (1989) (application of “interests of justice” standard in various jurisdictions). I otherwise join the opinion.