holding that V.T.C.S. articles 998, 999, now sections 341.001(e)(1) and 341.021(e) of the Local Government Code, give city police officers and city marshalls county-wide jurisdiction for warrantless arrests
How later courts described this case
- holding that V.T.C.S. articles 998, 999, now sections 341.001(e)(1) and 341.021(e) of the Local Government Code, give city police officers and city marshalls county-wide jurisdiction for warrantless arrests
- referring to Section III of majority opinion as "totally unnecessary to the resolution of the instant case" and "an advisory opinion" and stating that since "[t]he merits of appellant's petition can be disposed of without an inquiry as to [the issue addressed in Section III], ... all of the language in Section III of the majority opinion is pure dicta and totally advisory"
- relying on former revised civil statutes Articles 998 and 999, held that officer’s jurisdiction is county-wide, but case was later superseded by statute, and it continues to be cited today for holding that jurisdiction is determined by common law if it is not found in statute
- concurring and dissenting opinion of McCormick, J., joined by Onion, P J., and Davis, J.
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Kurtz, 2004 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1752 (2004)
Meadows v. State, 356 S.W.3d 33, 40 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (citing State v. Kurtz, 111 S.W.3d 315 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2003), aff'd, 152 S.W.3d 72 (Tex.Crim.App.2004)); see Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 732-33 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (“[T]he legislative expression of a peace officer’s jurisdiction must be found in some other statute or be controlled by common law.”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kurtz…
Questioned by Opinion No. (2002)
1 See also Yeager v. State, 23 S.W.3d 566, 571 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. granted) (noting that "the continued viability of the specific jurisdictional holding in Angel [that city police officers' jurisdiction is coextensive with the county sheriff's] may be open to question" because the court based its decision on precise language in former articles 998 and 999 equating the jurisdiction of city police officers w…
Questioned by Yeager v. State, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 69 (2003)
We did not grant discretionary review on whether Angel applies to this case, and we also note that the continued viability of Angel is squarely presented in Armendariz v. State, 02-0070, which is currently pending in this Court.
Questioned by Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401 (2003)
[18] "The continued viability of Angel is squarely presented in Armendariz v. State, 02-0070, which is currently pending in this Court.
Questioned by Yeager v. State, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 4202 (2000)
Furthermore, the continued viability of the specific jurisdictional holding in Angel may be open to question.
Declined to follow by State v. Kurtz, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6171 (2003)
In reaching this conclusion, we reject the State’s reliance on Angel for the proposition that a police officer’s jurisdiction is countywide.
The opinion
MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur in the result reached concerning the standing issue raised by the State for the first time (in this appeal) before this Court. My concurrence is based on my original opinion in Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), however, and not on any interpretation of whether a “decision” of a court of appeals (as used in Texas Rqje of Appellate Procedure 200) means only the bottom line of one of their opinions, only the reasoning used by the court in a particular case, or only a reason brought forth by one side or another in briefs, etc. Such squabbles are more appropriately addressed by the Rules of Appellate Procedure promulgated by this Court itself. Let us not forget that we write these rules, and if there is some ambiguity therein, or if they are subject to different interpretations, the appropriate place to settle our differences is in the rules.
In Wilson, supra, we said on original submission, quoting Steagald v. U.S., 451 U.S. 204 , 101 S.Ct. 1642 , 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981):
“The Government, however, may lose its right to raise factual issues of this sort *749 [reasonable expectation of privacy] before this Court [1] when it has made contrary assertions in the courts below, [2] when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts, [3] or when it has failed to raise such questions in a timely fashion during litigation.” Id. at 209 , 101 S.Ct. at 1646 . (emphasis and brackets added).
Wilson, supra at 663 . I still adhere to that view. F
I dissent to the jurisdiction holding. In interpreting legislative intent here we should be more guided by Chapter 311 of the Government Code, titled Code Construction Act. The tortured and maze-like meanderings of the majority opinion over the particular meaning of “jurisdiction” are hardly convincing for the proposition that the Legislature intended the word to be used in the sense that the majority wishes. The Legislature most recently enacted these statutes in 1875 and 1907 and amended them in 1967 and 1969. It is just as likely that the term “jurisdiction” was here intended to mean the levels of criminal offenses that a police officer could enforce (felony, misdemeanor, class “C” misdemeanor, offenses outside the Penal Code, etc.). Else the very wording of Art. 14.01, V.A.C.C.P. paragraphs (a) and (b) is redundant:
(a) A peace officer or any other person, may, without a warrant, arrest an offender when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view, if the offense is one classed as a felony or as an offense against the public peace.
(b) A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view.
Our prior caselaw is correct. For a felony or breach of the peace a police officer or any citizen can arrest anywhere; for other crimes committed in his presence a police officer had better be seeing them happen in “his own bailiwick.” Weeks v. State, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 524 , 106 S.W.2d 275, 276 (1937).
Where the legislative intent is so unclear, and when the reasoning has to be this circuitous, we can hardly say we are determining legislative intent. We are in fact ourselves legislating.
I dissent.
. Curiously, Judge McCormick in his concurring and dissenting opinion seems to limit the holding in Steagald to only the first method by which the government may lose its right to raise an issue on appeal. Only if one ignores method # 3, above, is Steagald “clearly inapplicable” as Judge McCormick maintains.