State v. Kemp

STORCKMAN, J.

{concurring). — Another persuasive indication that surplus funds in the city treasury and unexpended funds from previous years were intended to be included in calculating ‘ ‘ the general revenue fund of such year” is found in statutes comprising the county budget law. Section 50.670 provides that whenever the term “revenue” is used in the county budget law it “shall be understood and taken to mean the ordinary and general revenue to be used for the current expenses of the county * * * regardless of the source from which derived.” The section further provides that the county court shall prepare a “budget of estimated receipts and expenditures” and that “the receipts shall show the cash balance on hand as of January first and not obligated, also all revenue collected and an estimate of all revenue to be collected, also all moneys received or estimated to be received during the current year.” Thus it appears that the General Assembly intended that county budgets should be prepared so as to include surplus funds or funds appropriated but not used in previous years as well as current receipts and income. While the definitions and procedures provided in § 50.670' are limited to the county budget law, we may take into consideration statutes involving similar or related subject matter when such statutes shed light upon the meaning of the statute being construed, unless we are expressly prohibited or a contrary intention plainly appears. State ex rel. St. Louis Police Relief Ass’n. v. Igoe, 340 Mo. 1166 , 107 S.W.2d 929, 934 ; 16 C.J.S. 60, § 19b.

The governing body of Kansas City is required by the terms of the statute to appropriate for the use of the police board “the sum of money which will be necessary for the next fiscal year, to enable said board to discharge the duties * * * imposed upon it, and to meet the expenses of [527] the police department.” However, the amount so appropriated shall not exceed one-sixth of “the general revenue fund *397 of such year.” § 84.730 Y.A.M.S. If the sum so appropriated was payable immediately and without further limitation to the police board so that the board could build up surplus funds and maintain a reserve, the contention that the one-sixth limitation should apply only to current income of the’city would be more plausible. However, the board is only authorized “to requisition semimonthly upon the chief finance officer of the. city such sum, within the limits of the annual appropriation, as may he necessary for that period, which sum shall be allocated by said officer and placed to the credit of the police department.” § 84.780 V.A.M.S.

The statutes contemplate that the police board will budget its needs on-an annual basis and to hold that the board is entitled only to one-sixth of the current receipts and income when collected would be a departure from the legislative theory and plan. We find no clear expression of intention to exclude the cash on hand or surplus funds in calculating the “general revenue fund” for the purpose of determining the maximum appropriation. The terms used in statutes must be given their usual and ordinary meaning unless such construction will defeat the manifest intention of the statutory provision. O’Malley v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 335 Mo. 1115 , 75 S.W.2d 837 ; 82 C.J.S. 639, § ,329b. Whether the one-sixth limitation is too high or too low is a legislative matter and not for the courts.

For these additional reasons I concur in the opinion of the court.