former police matron was diagnosed with heart disease, a service connected disability which is presumed under language of statute to arise from active duty, and thus it was unnecessary for claimant to pinpoint any particular event as the cause of her condition
How later courts described this case
- former police matron was diagnosed with heart disease, a service connected disability which is presumed under language of statute to arise from active duty, and thus it was unnecessary for claimant to pinpoint any particular event as the cause of her condition
- distinguished in Reisner v. Board of Trustees, 203 N.W.2d 812, 815 (Iowa 1973)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Rawlings, J.
I respectfully dissent.
This case stands in certiorari. The municipal pension board denied petitioner a disability pension. The trial court reversed.
*1036 We have repeatedly held certiorari presents only a question of law and does not entitle the petitioner to a review of the evidence by the reviewing court. City of Iowa City v. White, 253 Iowa 41, 48, 49 , 111 N.W.2d 266 , and Dickey v. Civil Service Commission, 201 Iowa 1135, 1139, 1140 , 205 N.W. 961 .
We have also held the power of the courts in certiorari does not extend to or include a determination of disputed questions of fact upon which the inferior board or tribunal acted. Ebert v. Short, 199 Iowa 147, 153, 154 , 201 N.W. 793 .
In fact the task of the trial court and the duty of this court is not to review findings of fact by the pension board if they are sustained by any competent and substantial evidence. Courts should only examine the evidence presented to determine whether there was competent and substantial evidence to support the findings by the lower tribunal. Wood v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 253 Iowa 797, 801, 802 , 113 N.W.2d 710 , and Circle Exp. Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 249 Iowa 651, 653, 654 , 86 N.W.2d 888 .
Significantly Dr. James E. Kelsey reported to the board in part as follows:
“Mrs. Butler stated that she would retire on the 24th of July, 1965 but she stopped working on the 5th of July, 1965 because she wants to get a disability retirement. She stated that this would add to her retirement income. * * * Impression: I do not feel that Mrs. Butler is mentally or physically incapacitated for further performance of duty. It seems to me that she could certainly work until the date of her retirement. She has hypertensive cardiovascular disease, the cause of which is not known but it is probably the type of hypertension that will respond to weight reduction. I recommend that Mrs. Butler be retired from active duty on the 24th day of July, when she becomes 65 years of age. I do not feel that this should be a disability retirement.”
Also, Dr. Dennis H. Kelly, Jr., examined petitioner and reported to the board: “* * * she is certainly entitled to retire by reason of her general physical condition. I do not, however, find that heart disease is the predominant reason for her retirement.”
*1037 On review the trial court held in part as follows: “In the case at bar the Court expressly finds that the evidence,and reports before the Board conclusively established that the Plaintiff had qualified for the accidental disability benefits, and that it would be a clear and manifest injustiee-to deny her such benefits.”
Under the record this is nothing more nor less than a finding of fact by the trial court and a substitution of its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal. This is not in accord with our prior holdings.
The evidence in this case is in dispute and there is competent substantial evidence supporting the decision of the pension board.
I would reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to affirm.
Mason, J., joins in this dissent.