recognizing that the court has previously allowed parties to seek mandamus relief when they did not first present a request to the trial court because the demand would otherwise be futile (citing Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that the court has previously allowed parties to seek mandamus relief when they did not first present a request to the trial court because the demand would otherwise be futile (citing Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding
- holding that Attorney General’s "broad discretionary power” includes authority to settle actions contesting constitutionality of statutes
- holding that as a general rule mandamus is not available to compel an action which has not first been demanded and refused
- stating that mandamus will generally not lie to compel action that has not first been demanded and refused
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GAMMAGE, Justice,
dissenting.
For the reasons stated in Justice High-tower’s original dissent in this cause, I dissent to the failure to permit intervenors a motion for rehearing. Op. 749. Mandamus relief was not proper in this cause because relators consciously failed to exercise their legal remedy of intervention and appeal. The newly produced information that relators had attorneys in and out of the courtroom monitoring the case merely confirms what has already been observed— relators had ample opportunity to avail themselves of their legal remedy of intervention and appeal but, instead, sat on their rights and consciously chose to avoid intervening.
HIGHTOWER, J., joins in this dissent.