recognizing that the court has previously allowed parties to seek mandamus relief when they did not first present a request to the trial court because the demand would otherwise be futile (citing Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that the court has previously allowed parties to seek mandamus relief when they did not first present a request to the trial court because the demand would otherwise be futile (citing Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding
- holding that Attorney General’s "broad discretionary power” includes authority to settle actions contesting constitutionality of statutes
- holding that as a general rule mandamus is not available to compel an action which has not first been demanded and refused
- stating that mandamus will generally not lie to compel action that has not first been demanded and refused
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*755 OPINION ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
HECHT, Justice.
Despite the statement in our judgment of December 17, 1991, that “[n]o motions for rehearing shall be entertained”, some of the real parties in interest in this original proceeding, plaintiffs in the district court, have moved for leave to file a motion for rehearing. 1 Their motion for leave is denied.
Our authority to dispense with motions for rehearing in a particular case is recognized in Rule 190(a), Tex.R.App.P., which states in part: “In exceptional cases, if the ends of justice require, the court may shorten the time within which [a motion for rehearing] may be filed or even deny the right to file it altogether.” 2 We regularly disallow motions for rehearing when time is of the essence, as in cases involving the election process, when an expeditious resolution is critical to preserve the timely progression of the democratic process. E.g., Sears v. Bayoud, 786 S.W.2d 248, 254 (Tex.1990); Texas Democratic Executive Comm. v. Rains, 756 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Tex.1988); Clements v. Valles, 620 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex.1981); Garcia v. Carpenter, 525 S.W.2d 160 (Tex.1975); Luna v. Blanton, 478 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.1972); Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Bd., 471 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex.1971); Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375, 379 (Tex.1971); La Raza Unida Party v. Dean, 462 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex.1970); Spears v. Davis, 398 S.W.2d 921, 930 (Tex.1966); Seay v. Latham, 143 Tex. 1 , 182 S.W.2d 251, 255 (1944); Iles v. Walker, 132 Tex. 6 , 120 S.W.2d 418, 423 (1938); Benavides v. Atkins, 132 Tex. 1 , 120 S.W.2d 415, 418 (1938); Sterling v. Ferguson, 122 Tex. 122 , 53 S.W.2d 753, 763 (1932). In this case, the plurality opinion explained: “Because of the importance of resolving the issues that have been raised as expeditiously as possible to avoid any unnecessary disruption to the 1992 elections, we will refuse to consider any motions for rehearing, and none may be filed.” Ante, at 726. Our decision to refuse motions for rehearing in this case is thus consistent both with rule and practice.
There is no precedent for us to reconsider this decision. We know of no occasion when this Court has allowed a motion for rehearing after ordering that it would not do so. But this is hardly surprising. If by saying, “[n]o motions for rehearing shall be entertained”, we meant only, “we may or may not entertain a motion for rehearing, depending upon who files it and what it says”, a party could hardly be expected to take us seriously. Any party who wished to file a motion would be well advised to try. By refusing to adhere to our decision not to allow motions for rehearing in one case, we would cast doubt upon that decision in every case. The result would be to render this tool for avoiding delay and uncertainty in special cases useless.
Movants have demonstrated no compelling reason for us to allow them to file a motion for rehearing in disregard of our own order. They claim that in discovery conducted after we announced our decision in this case, they obtained evidence which provides additional support for their position that relators had ample opportunity to intervene in the Mena case in the district court and chose not to do so. Assuming movants have such evidence, their position remain flawed. As we said earlier: “even if relators could have intervened in Mena and opposed rendition of judgment in that case, their doing so would not relieve them of the effect of the judgment in Quiroz.” Ante, at 724. In Quiroz, plaintiffs, now movants here, filed suit, defendants answered, and the court rendered an agreed judgment, all in a matter of minutes. Mov-ants do not contend that they have uncovered any information showing how relators could have positioned themselves to intervene in Quiroz during the few minutes it was pending. Even if relators could have attempted to intervene in Quiroz, although *756 it appears to have been practically impossible, we concluded that the record demonstrated that the district court would almost certainly have struck their intervention.
Movants also contend that since we announced our decision relators have demonstrated that they do not wish to intervene in Mena or Quiroz, preferring instead to pursue their action in the United States District Court. Again assuming movants are correct, relators’ reluctance or refusal to intervene in Mena or Quiroz now, after all that has happened regarding redistricting since the district court rendered its judgments in those cases, has little bearing on whether they could or would have intervened then.
Finally, movants contend that by granting their motion for rehearing and setting aside our prior decision, we would in effect endorse the reapportionment plans previously adopted by the district court and thereby greatly expedite the 1992 elections. Movants have not attempted to explain how our ruling in their favor at this point would influence proceedings involving related issues in the federal courts over which we, of course, have no control. Assuming, however, that granting movants all the relief they seek would bring about all the effects they view as beneficial, we cannot “endorse” reapportionment plans which have never been reviewed on the merits by the district court, for all the reasons given in our previous opinions.
The legal issues in this case have been fully addressed. We decline to dignify the dissent by Justice Mauzy and Justice Dog-gett with further response.
PHILLIPS, C.J., and COOK, J., join in this opinion.
Concurring opinion by GONZALEZ, J.
Concurring opinion by CORNYN, J.
Dissenting opinion by MAUZY, J., in which DOGGETT, J., joins.
Dissenting opinion by GAMMAGE, J., in which HIGHTOWER, J., joins.
. Contrary to statements in the dissent, five members of the Court joined in the judgment.
. This rule was taken verbatim from former Rule 515(a), Tex.R.Civ.P., which was adopted effective September 1, 1941.