using the Webster's dictionary definition of "primarily," which was "fundamentally" or "principally"
How later courts described this case
- using the Webster's dictionary definition of "primarily," which was "fundamentally" or "principally"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CARTER, Justice
(concurring specially).
' I concur with the opinion of the court and agree that the role of the state in this disciplinary matter was “primarily adjudicative” for purposes of applying Iowa Code section 625.29(l)(b). I write separately to stress that in my view all administrative action that results in a contested case hearing does not necessarily fall under that statute. Almost all administrative action that causes adverse consequences to a party seeking attorney fees under section 625.29 will have gone through a contested case hearing process. That is a necessary consequence of the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. But, this does not mean that the administrative action that is the subject of the complaint was itself primarily adjudicative.
I also note with respect to the present case that the party requesting attorney fees does not qualify for that relief on a more basic ground. Under section 625.29 such fees are only allowed when the state has commenced a civil action or when the attorney-fee claimant has prevailed against the state on the merits of the dispute in a chapter 17A judicial review proceeding. Neither of these conditions is present in this dispute.
ANDREASEN, J., joins this special concurrence.