concluding that causation in criminal cases is generally a question of fact for the jury, that a victim’s contributory negligence is not a complete defense but may be considered as it relates to whether a defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause, and that a jury’s determination of causation will be reviewed under traditional sufficiency of the evidence standard
How later courts described this case
- concluding that causation in criminal cases is generally a question of fact for the jury, that a victim’s contributory negligence is not a complete defense but may be considered as it relates to whether a defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause, and that a jury’s determination of causation will be reviewed under traditional sufficiency of the evidence standard
- holding that a drag race co-participant’s negligence did not bar the defendant’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide, but reversing the conviction because the jury was not adequately instructed on proximate cause
- holding that trial court abused its discretion in admitting computer animated visualization of accident, in part because the animation depicted the accident fifteen times at various speeds
- concluding that absence of proximate cause instruction from pattern criminally negligent homicide causation required general causation instruction to be given to the jury
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
PER CURIAM.
The State of Tennessee has filed a petition to rehear asking this Court to reconsider certain portions of the opinion.
Contrary to the assertions of the petition the opinion does not require the giving of a special “proximate cause” instruction in every homicide case. The opinion requires the giving of a general causation instruction whenever the homicide offense does not itself explicitly or implicitly include a causation instruction. As the State recognizes, some of the homicide offenses include elements that implicitly instruct the jury that a causation finding is necessary. Also without merit is the State’s assertion that the suggested pattern jury instruction set out in footnote 18 conflicts with existing law and relieves the State of its burden of proof. The State’s petition confuses criminal negligence and causation. Both elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to establish criminally negligent homicide. Moreover, we emphasize that the language in footnote 16 is merely a suggestion which may be accepted, revised, or rejected by the Pattern Jury Instruction Committee.
Accordingly, the State’s petition to rehear is DENIED. Costs of this petition are taxed to the State of Tennessee, for which execution may issue if necessary.